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CHAPTER I 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS AND ACQUIRER RETURNS 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The valuation effect of information asymmetry between acquirers and targets has always 
received theoretical and empirical attention (Hansen (1987), Kedia, Panchapagesan, and Uysal 
(2006), Officer, Poulsen and Stegemoller (2005), Higgins and Rodriguez (2005)). Economic 
theories suggest that acquirers are susceptible to the “Winner’s Curse” problem in that they tend 
to overpay for targets and that the probability of overpaying increases with the degree of 
information asymmetry between acquirers and targets about the true value of target assets.  As 
experts in information gathering and production, financial intermediaries, investment banks in 
particular, have the potential to mitigate the asymmetric information problem faced by bidders. 
Some banks have informational advantages over others and can value targets more accurately. 
These banks can help acquirers avoid paying too much for targets, contributing positively to 
bidder shareholder gains.  
 Prior studies such as Bowers and Miller (1990), Servaes and Zenner (1996), and Rau 
(2000) focus on the ranking or tier of an investment bank as a proxy for its efficacy in gathering, 
producing, and processing information. These studies fail to find evidence that acquirers advised 
by top-ranked banks create more value for their shareholders. In this paper, we concentrate on an 
alternative characteristic of financial advisors and investigate whether an advisor’s locality affects 
its ability to serve as an effective information agent.  
 Specifically, in a sample of cross-border acquisitions made by U.S. firms, we examine 
whether investment banks from the same country as target firms can effectively reduce the 
asymmetric information about the value of target assets and help acquirers avoid overbidding. 
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When a U.S. firm buys a foreign target, it faces unfamiliar market conditions, different 
regulations from foreign governments and agencies, limited availability of information about the 
target, and even less reliable accounting numbers from the target’s financial statements. All these 
can increase the level of asymmetric information about the value of target assets. Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) document that U.S. firms acquiring foreign targets experience significantly 
lower abnormal returns than those making domestic acquisitions, consistent with the argument 
that cross-border bidders are more susceptible to the “Winner’s Curse” problem. Similarly, Eckbo 
and Thorburn (2000) find that acquisitions of Canadian targets by Canadian firms generate 
significantly higher bidder returns than acquisitions of Canadian targets by U.S. firms.  
 Financial advisors domiciled in targets’ home countries conceivably have an information 
advantage over other financial advisors in valuing target assets. Local banks can better understand 
targets’ financial statements, more accurately assess target management quality and local 
competitive landscape, and even have access to private information about targets via local social 
networks. A strand of studies has examined the relationship between geographic proximity and 
information flow. For example, Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) argue that geographic 
proximity facilitates information transfer, reduces the cost of information gathering, and provides 
access to private information.  They document a ‘local bias’ in mutual funds’ investment 
portfolios and higher returns to the local investments. A similar local bias in the portfolios of 
individual investors is also documented by Huberman (2001), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), 
Zhu (2002), and Ivkovich and Weisbennar (2003)). In addition, Malloy (2005) reports evidence 
that local analysts are more accurate in earnings forecasts due to their information advantages. In 
the context of merger and acquisitions, Kedia, Panchapagesan, and Uysal (2006) find that firms 
acquiring local firms experience significantly higher abnormal returns than those making non-
local acquisitions. In sum, we expect acquirers advised by banks from target home countries are 
less likely to overpay for targets. This will translate into higher abnormal returns for acquirer 
shareholders around the acquisition announcement date.  
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 In a sample of 382 cross-border acquisitions by U.S. firms from 1990 to 2006, we find 
support for our hypothesis. Our results show acquisition announcements made by firms assisted 
by banks from target home countries generate higher abnormal bidder returns than other 
acquisitions, and the difference is significant both statistically and economically. Specifically, 
bidders assisted by local advisors experience abnormal returns 1.9% higher than those advised by 
non-local banks. This result holds after we control for bidder-, deal- and target country- 
characteristics that are potential determinants of bidder returns documented in the literature.  
 We also examine the acquirer’s choice of payment. Acquirers facing high level of 
asymmetric information about the value of target assets have great incentives to use stock as the 
financing method, since by accepting bidder stock, target shareholders bear any risk of 
overpayment (Hansen (1987)). If a local advisor can effectively reduce the asymmetric 
information problem, it can serve as a substitute for stock financing. In our empirical test, we do 
find that acquirers advised by local banks use less stock to finance the payment. Finally, as 
another piece of evidence on the beneficial role played by local banks, we find that acquirers 
advised by local banks complete the transactions faster than those advised by non-local banks.  
In further analysis, we estimate a probit model to investigate the circumstances under 
which an acquirer hires a local advisor. Consistent with the asymmetric information story, we 
find that acquiring firms tend to hire advisors from target home countries when they are buying 
smaller firms and firms in countries with low accounting standards. We also find that local 
advisors are more likely in diversifying acquisitions, hostile deals, and tender offers. It is in these 
types of acquisitions where the asymmetric information problem is most acute. Given that bidders 
do not choose target-country advisors randomly, we compute the inverse Mills ratio from the 
probit model of advisor selection and include it in all the previous regressions. Our earlier results 
continue to hold. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources 
and acquisition sample. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
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2. Sample construction 
 
We obtain a list of 382 acquisitions of foreign public firms made by U.S. public 
companies during the period of 1990 to 2006 from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. We require that (i) The deal value disclosed in SDC is more 
than $1 million and is at least 1 percent of the acquirer’s market value of equity measured on the 
11th trading day prior to the announcement date,1 (ii) the acquirer has annual financial statement 
information available from COMPUSTAT and stock return data (210 trading days prior to 
acquisition announcements) from the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) Daily Stock Price and Returns file, (iii) the acquirer has financial advisor 
information available from SDC.  
We also obtain from SDC the home countries of bidders’ financial advisors and target 
firms. We define a bidder’s financial advisor to be a “local advisor” if the advisor and the target 
firm come from the same country. All other advisors are “non-local advisors”. These may include 
U.S. banks, or banks from third nations other than U.S. and the target country. We recognize that 
some non-local advisors, for example, Goldman Sachs, although a U.S. bank, may have branches 
or offices in the target country and their local operations may also give these banks informational 
advantages in valuing target firms. However, this should only work against us finding any 
significant positive effects of local advisors.  
In Table 1.1, we present the distribution by announcement year of our acquisition sample. 
Beginning in 1990, the number of cross-border acquisitions in each year increases annually until 
it reaches its highest level in 1997 and 1998. Then it drops off during the early 2000’s. This trend 
                                                 
1 SDC defines the deal value as the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and 
expenses. The dollar value includes the amount paid for all common stock, common stock equivalents, 
preferred stock, debt, options, assets, warrants, and stake purchases made within six months of the 
announcement date of the transaction 
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is very similar to that of overall U.S. domestic acquisition activities documented by Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), whose sample period ends in 2001.  
We divide the sample into deals involving advisors from the same country as target firms 
and those that are not. We find U.S. acquirers hire local advisors in 91 (23.82%) of the 382 
acquisitions. We also report the year distribution for transactions involving local advisors and 
those with non-local advisors, respectively. The distributions for the two groups of acquisitions 
are relatively similar, especially before 2000. In our regression analyses, we do control for the 
calendar year fixed-effects.   
 
Table 1.1. Sample distribution 
 
The sample consists of 382 mergers and acquisitions of foreign public targets by U.S. public firms between 
1990 and 2006 (listed in SDC).  Local advisors are bidders’ financial advisors that are in the same countries 
as target firms.  
 
 
Whole sample 
(N=382) 
Local advisors 
(N=91) 
Non-local advisors 
(N=291) 
 N % N % N % 
 
1990 6 1.57 0 0.00 6 2.06 
1991 4 1.05 1 1.10 3 1.03 
1992 6 1.57 0 0.00 6 2.06 
1993 8 2.09 1 1.10 7 2.41 
1994 17 4.45 4 4.40 13 4.47 
1995 25 6.54 7 7.69 18 6.19 
1996 22 5.76 6 6.59 16 5.50 
1997 43 11.27 9 9.89 34 11.68 
1998 43 11.27 9 9.89 34 11.68 
1999 40 10.47 11 12.09 29 9.97 
2000 30 7.85 5 5.49 25 8.59 
2001 23 6.02 7 7.69 16 5.50 
2002 23 6.02 10 10.99 13 4.47 
2003 19 4.97 5 5.49 14 4.81 
2004 26 6.81 6 6.59 20 6.87 
2005 18 4.71 8 8.79 10 3.44 
2006 29 7.59 2 2.20 27 9.28 
       
Total 382 100.00 91 100.00 291 100.00 
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3. Empirical results 
 
3.1. Variable construction 
 In the next three subsections, we discuss the measurement of two categories of variables: 
acquirer return as the dependent variable, and bidder-, deal- and target-country characteristics as 
the control variables. Our key explanatory variable is an indicator which equals one if an acquirer 
uses a local financial advisor, and zero otherwise.  
 
3.1.1. Acquirer return 
We measure bidder announcement effects by market model adjusted stock returns around 
initial acquisition announcements (see Brown and Warner (1985)). We obtain the announcement 
dates from SDC. We compute five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the window 
encompassed by event days (-2, +2), where event day 0 is the acquisition announcement date.2 
We use the CRSP value-weighted return as the market return and estimate the market model 
parameters over the period from event day -210 to event day -11. 
As shown in Panel A of Table 1.2, the average CAR for the whole sample is -0.317%, 
which is not significantly different from zero at the conventional level. The median is -0.154% 
and not significant either. This is consistent with Doukas and Travlos (1988) who find that U.S. 
bidders experience no significant returns in cross-border mergers. Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2005) also fail to document significant 3-day CAR for their cross-border sample during the 
period of 1991-1995. However, when we divide the sample into deals with local advisors and 
those with non-local advisors, we find that bidders hiring local advisors experience significantly 
higher abnormal returns around the announcement date. Specifically, the mean (median) CAR for 
bidders using local advisors is 1.044% (0.484%). The mean is not significantly different from 0, 
while the median is significant at the 5% level. However, the mean (median) CAR for acquirers 
                                                 
2 Our results are not sensitive to the use of 11-day window (-5,+5) or 3-day window (-1,+1). 
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Table 1.2. Summary statistics 
 
The sample consists of 382 mergers and acquisitions of foreign public targets by U.S. public firms between 
1990 and 2006 (listed in SDC). Variable definitions are in Appendix 1.1. For each variable, the first row 
presents the mean, while the second row presents the median. a, b, and c stand for statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
  
Whole 
Sample 
(N=382) 
Local 
advisors 
(N=91) 
Non-local 
advisors 
(N=291) Difference 
p-value 
for tests in 
difference 
Panel A: Bidder cumulative abnormal returns 
CAR (-2,+2) Mean -0.317% 1.044% -0.742% b 1.786% b 0.031 
 Median -0.154% 0.484% b -0.398% b 0.882% a 0.005 
 
Panel B: Bidder Characteristics  
Total Assets ($mil) Mean 7,599 4,595 8,558 -3,963 b 0.027 
 Median 2,042 1,871 2,225 -354 0.155 
Tobin’s q Mean 2.222 2.098 2.260 -0.162 0.330 
 Median 1.679 1.760 1.654 0.106 0.439 
Free cash flow Mean 0.506 0.224 0.593 -0.369 0.132 
 Median 0.230 0.198 0.243 -0.045 0.135 
Leverage Mean 0.158 0.151 0.160 -0.009 0.578 
 Median 0.133 0.112 0.134 -0.022 0.748 
Toehold  Mean 0.085 0.116 0.075 0.041 0.135 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0.173 
Prior Acquisitions Mean 0.257 0.264 0.254 -0.010 0.895 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0.570 
 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Relative size Mean 0.252 0.253 0.252 -0.001 0.981 
 Median 0.092 0.092 0.090 0.002 0.614 
Percentage of stock Mean 0.227 0.175 0.243 -0.068 b 0.039 
 Median 0 0 0 0 c 0.063 
Diversifying  Mean 0.230 0.286 0.213 0.073 0.175 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0.152 
Competed Mean 0.152 0.154 0.151 0.003 0.952 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0.952 
Hostile Mean 0.084 0.154 0.062 0.092 b 0.025 
 Median 0 0 0 0 a 0.006 
Tender offer Mean 0.521 0.648 0.481 0.167 a 0.005 
 Median 1 1 1 0 a 0.005 
Mean 115 105 118 -13 0.275 Number of days to 
complete Median 97 85 98 -13 0.328 
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using non-local advisors is -0.742% (-0.398%) and both the mean and the median are 
significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. In addition, the statistics of tests for differences in 
means or medians are both highly significant. Therefore, the univariate analysis supports our 
hypothesis that local advisors help U.S. acquirers evaluate foreign targets more accurately and 
reduce the likelihood of overbidding.  
 
3.1.2. Other determinants of acquirer returns 
Despite the support we find in the univariate analysis, we need to control for other 
determinants of bidder announcement returns in order to draw reliable inferences. We consider 
three categories of factors that are related to acquirer returns: bidder characteristics, deal features, 
and target-country characteristics.  
The bidder characteristics that we control for include firm size, Tobin’s Q, leverage, and 
free cash flow (FCF), all of which are measured at the fiscal year end prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find robust evidence that bidder size is 
negatively correlated with acquirer return measured by the announcement-period CAR. They 
interpret this size effect as evidence supporting the managerial hubris hypothesis (Roll (1986)), 
since they find that larger acquirers on average pay higher premiums and make acquisitions that 
generate negative dollar synergies. We define firm size as the log transformation of the acquirer’s 
book value of total assets. We also use alternative measures, such as the log transformation of the 
acquirer’s market value of equity or net sales and find very similar results.  
 Prior studies find that an acquirer’s Tobin’s Q has an ambiguous effect on CAR. Lang, 
Stulz, and Walking (1991) and Servaes (1991) document a positive relation for tender offers and 
public-firm acquisitions, respectively, while Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find a 
negative relation in a comprehensive sample of acquisitions. We define Tobin’s Q as the ratio of 
a bidder’s market value of assets over its book value of assets, where the market value of assets is 
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computed as the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity (item60) plus the 
market value of common equity (item25×item199).  
Following Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, we also control for firm leverage 
and free cash flow (FCF). We expect leverage to have a positive effect on CAR since higher debt 
levels help reduce free cash flow and limit managerial discretion. On the other hand, the free cash 
flow hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient for FCF, since managers at firms with more free 
cash flows have more resources available to them to engage in empire building. Leverage is 
defined as a firm’s book value of long-term debt (item9) and short-term debt (item34) divided by 
its market value of total assets, and FCF is equal to operating income before depreciation 
(item13) minus interest expense (item15) minus income taxes (item16) minus capital 
expenditures (item128) minus the change in working capital, scaled by deal value. We divide 
FCF by deal value to measure how many internal resources are available for managers to make 
this particular acquisition and thus directly test the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Finally, we include the acquirer’s toehold in the target and the acquirer’s past acquisition 
experience in the target’s country.  We expect the larger the acquirer’s ownership in the target 
prior to the takeover, the less valuation uncertainty. In addition, toeholds can deter potential 
competing bids and help bidders win the takeover battles at low price. Acquirers’ prior 
acquisition experience in target countries can also help them more accurately value the next target 
and improve future acquisition performance. Therefore, we expect both toehold and prior 
acquisition experience to have positive effects on acquirer returns. We measure an acquirer’s 
prior acquisition experience by the number of deals the acquirer completed in the target’s country 
during the past five years. We also use the total dollar value of these deals as an alternative 
measure and find similar results. 
The summary statistics of these variables are shown in Panel B of Table 1.2. We also 
separately report means and medians for deals involving local advisors and those involving non- 
local advisors. The tests of difference in means or medians show that the two groups of bidders 
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are similar, except that the average bidder that hires a local advisor is smaller than the average 
bidder not using a local advisor. The p-value for the test of difference in means of bidder size is 
0.027. Given the evidence in Moeller et. al. (2004) that bidder size is negatively related to bidder 
returns, the higher CARs for bidders hiring local advisors (shown in Panel A Table 1.2) might 
just reflect the size effect. However, we later show that after controlling for the bidder size, the 
positive effect of local advisors still holds.  
The deal characteristics that we control for include relative deal size, method of payment, 
industry relatedness of the acquisition, whether the deal is competed, whether the bid is hostile, 
and an indicator for tender offers.  
We control for relative deal size since studies by Asquith et al. (1983) and Moeller et al. 
(2004) find that bidder announcement returns increase in relative deal size, although the reverse is 
true for the subsample of large bidders in Moeller et al. (2004). Relative deal size is defined as 
deal value over the bidder’s market value of equity, measured at the 11th trading day before the 
announcement date.  
The method of payment is also related to the stock market response to acquisition 
announcements. It is well known that bidders experience significantly negative abnormal returns 
when they pay for their acquisitions with equity and this is generally attributed to the adverse 
selection problem in equity issuance analyzed by Myers and Majluf (1984).3 We control for the 
method of payment by including the percentage of bidder stock used in the transaction. We 
expect that bidder returns are decreasing in this variable.  
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) find that diversifying acquisitions usually destroy 
shareholder value, while potentially benefiting self-interested managers. Diversification can 
increase the expected utility of poorly diversified risk-averse managers by reducing firm risk 
(Amihud and Lev (1981)). Managers can also acquire unrelated assets that fit their own strength 
                                                 
3 For example, Travlos (1987), Amihud et al. (1990), Servaes (1991) and Brown and Ryngaert (1991) find 
that bidders experience significantly negative abnormal returns on the announcement of stock-financed 
acquisitions, but not on the announcement of cash-financed acquisitions.  
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so that it is more costly for shareholders to replace them (Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). We 
classify an acquisition as diversifying if the target and the bidder do not share a Fama-French 
industry.4 
We also control for deals with competing bidders and hostile deals. Acquirers facing 
competition from other bidders experience lower abnormal returns (Moeller et al. (2004)), as well 
as bidders making hostile offers (Schwert (2000)). Finally, we also include a dummy variable that 
equals one if the deal takes the form of tender offer.  
The summary statistics of these variables are reported in Panel C of Table 1.2. Several 
interesting findings emerge. First, both the mean and median difference tests show that bidders 
hiring advisors from the target country are less likely to pay with stock. Acquiring firms choose 
to use their stock as deal consideration to share potential overbidding risks with targets when they 
perceive there is more valuation uncertainty about targets (Hansen (1987)). To the extent that 
local advisors reduce the likelihood of bidders overpaying, higher percentage of cash is expected 
to be used if bidders are assisted by local advisors. Second, the mean and median difference tests 
also show that firms making tender offers and hostile bids tend to hire local banks.  In tender 
offer and hostile deals, bidders typically bypass target management and boards of directors and 
thus have limited information available from target management teams. This will make it harder 
for acquirers to accurately value targets. Therefore, bidders should have greater incentives to use 
local advisors.  
 The target-country characteristics we include in the regression of acquirer returns are 
target-country economic and financial development, shareholder protection, and accounting 
quality. All the target-country variables are taken from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) (henceforth LLSV). We use the log of GNP per capita as a proxy for the economic 
and financial development in target countries. Lower level of economic and financial 
                                                 
4 As a robustness check, we use 3-digit sic to define diversifying acquisitions and find qualitatively similar 
results. 
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development is associated with higher asymmetric information and thus may result in lower 
bidder returns.  
Similar to Rossi and Volpin (2004), we also include a measure of shareholder protection 
strength in the target country. It is defined as each country’s anti-director rights index multiplied 
by its rule of law score and then scaled by 10. Both the anti-director rights index and the rule of 
law score come from LLSV (1998). The anti-director rights index is constructed by adding one 
point for each anti-director right that protects minority shareholders.  It ranges from 0 to 6. A 
higher index represents better shareholder rights. The rule of law index measures the quality of 
enforcement of investor rights. Therefore, a higher product between the antidirector rights index 
and the rule of law index represents better and more effective shareholder protection. LLSV 
(2000) hypothesizes that higher synergies can result from acquisitions of firms in countries with 
poor investor protection by companies that come from countries with good investor protection. 
According to LLSV (1998), U.S. is among the countries with the strongest shareholder protection. 
If the market for corporate control in countries with poor shareholder protection is not perfectly 
competitive, U.S. bidders may capture some portion of the total gains. Therefore, we expect the 
shareholder protection measure to have a positive coefficient. 
Finally, we control for a country’s accounting quality using an indicator variable that 
equals one if the country’s accounting quality index is below the sample median, and zero 
otherwise.  According to LLSV(1998), the accounting quality index is constructed by rating 
firms’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion and omission of 90 items. 5  A higher index 
corresponds to better accounting quality. Public financial statements are expected to contain more 
reliable information about targets if they are in countries with higher accounting ratings, 
facilitating bidders in valuing target assets. Thus, we expect the dummy variable of low 
accounting ratings to be negatively associated with bidder returns.  
                                                 
5 These items can be classified into 7 groups: general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds 
flow statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special items.   
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3.2 Regression results 
We present the regression results in Table 1.3. In all specifications, we control for year 
and Fama-French 48-industry dummies. We adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity (White 
(1980)) and acquirer clustering. In column (1), we include bidder, deal, and target-country 
characteristics described in Section 3.1. In column (2), we exclude the country characteristics 
from the regression and add target-country fixed effects instead. Coefficient estimates show that 
consistent with our hypothesis, local advisors have a positive effect on acquirer returns and the 
effect is significant both statistically and economically. For example, the coefficient estimate of 
the local advisor dummy in column (1) is 1.901 with a p-value of 0.05. Acquirer returns for firms 
hiring local banks are 1.901% higher, about one third of the standard deviation of our sample 
CAR (6.540%). Even after we control for target country fixed effects in column (2), the 
coefficient estimate of the local advisor dummy remains significant at the 10% level under a two-
sided test. 
For other control variables, we observe that bidder size has a significantly negative effect 
on bidder announcement returns and bidder returns are decreasing in the percentage of bidders’ 
stock used in the transaction. Among the target country characteristics that are included in the 
first column, we find that the abnormal returns of U.S. acquirers declines with the level of 
shareholder protection in target countries. This is consistent with a hypothesis in LLSV (2000) 
that acquisitions of firms in countries with weak shareholder protection by firms that are from 
countries with strong shareholder protection generate higher synergies. Thus, bidder returns in 
such deals will be higher if acquirers can capture some portion of the synergistic gains. 
 
3.3 Adjust for selection bias 
The bidder’s decision to hire an advisor from the target country is potentially not random. 
This may introduce selection bias into the OLS estimates reported in Table 1.3. To correct the 
selection bias, we adopt Heckman (1979)’s two-step procedure to re-estimate the OLS models of  
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Table 1.3. Regression analysis of bidder returns 
 
The sample consists of 382 mergers and acquisitions of foreign public targets by U.S. public firms between 
1990 and 2006 (listed in SDC).  The dependent variable is 5-day acquirer cumulative abnormal return 
around the announcement date. Local advisor is a dummy variable that is one if the acquirer’s financial 
advisor is in the same country as the target, and zero otherwise. Definitions of other independent variables 
are in Appendix 1.1. In parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(White (1980)) and acquirer clustering. a, b, and c stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. Both regressions control for year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficient estimates 
are suppressed for brevity. 
 
Estimation method: OLS (1) (2) 
Key Explanatory Variable:   
     Local advisor  1.901 b 1.822 c 
 (0.050) (0.088) 
Bidder Characteristics:   
      Log(assets) -0.576 b -0.569 b 
 (0.025) (0.042) 
      Tobin’s q 0.107 0.082 
 (0.389) (0.562) 
      Free cash flow 0.203 0.241 
 (0.310) (0.225) 
      Leverage 1.950 1.031 
 (0.553) (0.763) 
      Toehold -0.608 -1.209 
 (0.660) (0.419) 
      Past acquisition activity 0.758 0.889 
 (0.240) (0.160) 
Deal  Characteristics:   
      Relative deal size 0.038 0.090 
 (0.980) (0.957) 
      Percentage of stock -4.396 a -4.168 a 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
      Diversifying acquisition 0.210 0.167 
 (0.822) (0.873) 
      Competed 0.655 0.996 
 (0.452) (0.297) 
      Hostile -0.400 -0.525 
 (0.722) (0.667) 
      Tender Offer -0.054 -0.232 
 (0.936) (0.748) 
Target-country  Characteristics:   
      Log(GNP per capita)  0.529  
 (0.349)  
      Shareholder protection -0.676 c  
 (0.077)  
      Countries with low accounting ratings 0.844  
 (0.356)  
      Target-country fixed effects No Yes 
Number of Obs. 382 382 
Adjusted R2 15.17% 13.96% 
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bidder returns. In the first step, we estimate a probit model to examine the determinants of a 
bidder’s decision to hire a local advisor.  Then we compute the inverse Mills ratio from the first-
stage probit model and add it in the second-stage OLS regressions. 
In the probit model, we include several proxies for the level of asymmetric information 
faced by acquirers. The first proxy is the target size, measured by the log of deal value. Smaller 
targets generally are associated with higher level of asymmetric information and create more 
valuation uncertainty for U.S. acquirers. Thus, we expect that a U.S. bidder is more likely to hire 
a local advisor when buying a small foreign target. The rest measures of information asymmetry 
are defined in the previous section, including a dummy variable for low accounting ratings, 
bidders’ toehold, and bidders’ past acquisition experience, an indicator for diversifying 
acquisitions, and dummy variables for hostile deals and tender offers. We expect firms making 
acquisitions in countries with low accounting ratings have greater incentives to hire local banks as 
their financial advisors. The same is true for firms acquiring targets in unrelated industries. A 
bidder’ toehold in the target and past acquisition experience in the target country may reduce the 
level of asymmetric information about the true value of target assets and hence reduce its need to 
use a local advisor. Finally, bidders have less access to target boards and managers in tender 
offers and hostile deals. Having limited information from the target management team, a U.S. 
bidder may turn to a local investment bank which can value the target assets more accurately.  
Other variables we control for include bidder size, competed deal dummy, and the log of GNP per 
capita in the target country. 
We present the probit regression results in Table 1.4. We control for year and Fama-
French 48-industry dummies in our regression. We also adjust standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and acquirer clustering. In column (1), we present the estimated 
coefficients and their p-values. In column (2), we report the marginal effects of these estimates. 
The marginal effects are calculated at the mean value of the continuous variables. For the dummy 
variables the effect of a change from 0 to 1 is calculated.  
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Table 1.4. Probit model of a bidder’s decision to hire a local advisor 
 
The sample consists of 382 mergers and acquisitions of foreign public targets by U.S. public firms between 
1990 and 2006 (listed in SDC).  The dependent variable is one if the acquirer’s financial advisor is in the 
same country as the target, and zero otherwise. Other variable definitions are in Appendix 1.1. In 
parentheses in the first column are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 
(1980)) and acquirer clustering. a, b, and c stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. In the second column are the marginal effects of estimated coefficients. The marginal effects 
are calculated at the mean value of the continuous variables. For the dummy variables the effect of a 
change from 0 to 1 is calculated. The probit regression controls for year and industry fixed effects, whose 
coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity.  
 
Regression method: Probit  
 Coefficient estimates Marginal effects 
 (p-value)  
Bidder Characteristics:   
      Log(assets) 0.056 0.006 
 (0.450)  
      Toehold 0.268 0.031 
 (0.501)  
      Past acquisition activity 0.094 0.011 
 (0.454)  
   
Deal  Characteristics:   
      Log (deal value) -0.185 b -0.021 
 (0.031)  
      Diversifying acquisition 0.519 b 0.074 
 (0.027)  
      Competed 0.001 0.000 
 (0.999)  
      Hostile 0.832 b 0.157 
 (0.011)  
      Tender Offer 0.628 a 0.072 
 (0.002)  
Target-country  Characteristics:   
      Log(GNP per capita)  0.803 a 0.092 
 (0.002)  
      Countries with low accounting ratings 0.476 b 0.051 
 (0.030)  
   
   
      Year fixed effects Yes 
      Industry fixed effects Yes 
   
Number of Obs. 382 
Log-likelihood -146.58 
Pseudo- R2 30.11% 
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Consistent with our hypothesis, several proxies of the asymmetric information about the 
value of target assets have coefficient estimates that have the right signs and are also statistically 
significant. Specifically, we find that firms acquiring smaller foreign targets and targets in 
unrelated industries and in countries with low accounting quality are more likely to hire financial 
advisors from target home countries. We also find local advisors are more popular in hostile deals 
and tender offers. Among other control variables, the log of GNP per capita positively contributes 
to the use of local advisors. The GNP per capita may proxy for the capital market development in 
the target country. A more developed financial market is associated with a greater number of 
high-quality investment banks available for foreign bidders. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
this variable is positively associated with a bidder’s decision to use a local bank. The probit 
model also has relatively good explanatory power, with a Pseudo R-square of 0.30. 
Based on this probit regression, we calculate the inverse Mills ratio and include it in the 
OLS models in Table 1.3.  As shown in Table 1.5, adjusting for self-selection bias does not affect 
our results. The estimates of the local advisor dummy are qualitatively the same as in Table 1.3. 
The statistical significance levels are also very similar. In sum, the results support our hypothesis 
that local advisors help acquirers avoid overpaying and have positive effects on bidder returns. 
This conclusion does not change even after adjusting for the selection bias embedded in a 
bidder’s decision to hire a local advisor.  
 
3.4. Method of payment 
 Hansen (1987) argues that bidders can choose stock as the financing currency when the 
asymmetric information about the target’s true value is high. This is because by accepting 
bidders’ stock, target shareholders share the risk of bidders overpaying. However, if bidders pay 
for targets with cash, bidder shareholders bear all the risk of overvaluation. To the extent that 
advisors from the target country reduce the amount of asymmetric information about the value of 
target assets and hence help bidders avoid overpaying, we expect bidders to have fewer incentives  
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Table 1.5. Regression analysis of bidder returns after controlling for selection bias 
 
The sample consists of 382 mergers and acquisitions of foreign public targets by U.S. public firms between 
1990 and 2006 (listed in SDC).  Lamda is the inverse mill ratio calculated from the probit model in Table 
1.4. Other variables are the same as in Table 1.3. In parentheses are p-values based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and acquirer clustering. a, b, and c stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Estimation method: Heckman (1) (2) 
Key Explanatory Variable:   
     Local advisor  1.916 b 1.833 c 
 (0.049) (0.085) 
Bidder Characteristics:   
      Log(assets) -0.479 -0.449 
 (0.150) (0.216) 
      Tobin’s q 0.117 0.092 
 (0.363) (0.527) 
      Free cash flow 0.197 0.234 
 (0.344) (0.261) 
      Leverage 1.781 0.834 
 (0.598) (0.813) 
      Toehold -1.011 -1.721 
 (0.535) (0.631) 
      Past acquisition activity 0.661 0.773 
 (0.333) (0.252) 
Deal  Characteristics:   
      Relative deal size 0.433 0.578 
 (0.828) (0.793) 
      Percentage of stock -4.321 a -4.077 a 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
      Diversifying acquisition -0.319 -0.486 
 (0.835) (0.781) 
      Competed 0.746 1.126 
 (0.398) (0.246) 
      Hostile -1.181 -1.525 
 (0.597) (0.549) 
      Tender Offer -0.634 -0.971 
 (0.662) (0.542) 
Target-country  Characteristics:   
      Log(GNP per capita)  -0.323  
 (0.881)  
      Shareholder protection -0.677 c  
 (0.077)  
      Countries with low accounting ratings 0.377  
 (0.802)  
Self-selectivity correction:   
      Lamda -1.239 -1.552 
 (0.668) (0.631) 
      Target-country fixed effects No Yes 
Number of Obs. 382 382 
Adjusted R2 14.96% 13.75% 
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to finance with stock when advised by local banks. To test this hypothesis, we regress the 
proportion of bidder stock used in the transaction on the local bank dummy variable. We follow 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) to control for a series of determinants of the method of M&A payment.  
 The amount of cash available for a bidder to finance a deal comes from two sources: cash 
generated internally and cash raised by debt financing.  We include the free cash flow measure 
defined in the regression of bidder returns to control for the first source of cash. We expect FCF 
to be negatively related to the proportion of bidder stock in each deal. Following Faccio and 
Masulis (2005), we construct several proxies for a bidder’s debt capacity to control for the second 
source of cash. These variables include firm size, leverage, and proportion of tangible assets, 
measured by the ratio of a bidder’s property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to its book value of 
assets. Larger firms tend to be more diversified and have easier access to the debt market. Firms 
with higher leverage ratios are more constrained to issue more debt, as well as companies with 
fewer tangible assets. Therefore, we expect firm size and PPE to have negative effects on stock 
financing and leverage to have a positive effect.  
 A bidder has greater incentives to finance with stock when its stock is overvalued (Myers 
and Majluf (1984)). We include bidders’ pre-announcement stock price runup, which is measured 
by bidder’s buy-and-hold abnormal return over the 200-day window (event days -210 to -11) with 
the CRSP value-weighted market index as the benchmark. We also use bidders’ Tobin’s q as an 
alternative measure of bidder stock overvaluation. We expect both measures to have positive 
effects on stock financing.  
The rest of control variables are the same as those in column (2) in Table 1.3. They 
include: a bidder’s toehold, past acquisition experience, relative deal size, and dummy variables 
for diversifying acquisitions, competed deals, hostile deals and tender offers. We also control for 
target country fixed effects and year and Fama-French 48-industry dummies.  
The regression results are shown in Table 1.6. Column (1) presents the results of the OLS 
model without adjusting self-selection bias. Column (2) presents the results based on Heckman  
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Table 1.6. Regression analysis of the method of payment 
 
The sample consists of 382 mergers and acquisitions of foreign public targets by U.S. public firms between 
1990 and 2006 (listed in SDC).  The dependent variable is the proportion of deal payment that is stock. 
Local advisor is a dummy variable that is one if the acquirer’s financial advisor is in the same country as 
the target, and zero otherwise. Lamda is the inverse mill ratio calculated from the probit model in Table 
1.4. Definitions of other independent variables are in Appendix 1.1. In parentheses are p-values based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and acquirer clustering. a, b, and c stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year and 
industry fixed effects, whose coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimation method OLS Heckman two-step Tobit 
Key Explanatory Variable:    
     Local advisor  -0.112 b -0.124 b -0.974 b 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.041) 
Bidder Characteristics:    
      Log(assets) -0.027 c -0.024 -0.195 
 (0.082) (0.136) (0.138) 
      Tobin’s q 0.032 a 0.032 a 0.286 b 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) 
      Free cash flow -0.019 b -0.019 b -0.165 b 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.021) 
      Leverage -0.286 -0.293 -3.034 
 (0.150) (0.137) (0.106) 
      PPE -0.070 -0.056 -0.444 
 (0.525) (0.617) (0.611) 
      Stock price runup 0.081 a 0.082 a 0.630 b 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.031) 
      Toehold -0.018 -0.024 -2.217 c 
 (0.800) (0.740) (0.067) 
      Past acquisition activity 0.016 0.016 0.244 
 (0.574) (0.581) (0.295) 
Deal  Characteristics:    
      Relative deal size 0.159 a 0.164 a 1.355 a 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
      Diversifying acquisition -0.034 -0.036 -0.223 
 (0.482) (0.456) (0.586) 
      Competed -0.091 c -0.088 c -1.070 c 
 (0.085) (0.097) (0.059) 
      Hostile -0.027 -0.029 -0.766 
 (0.594) (0.598) (0.252) 
      Tender Offer -0.134 a -0.139 a -1.078 a 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
 
Self-selectivity correction:    
      Lamda  -0.011  
  (0.279)  
      Target-country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 382 382 382 
Adjusted R2 26.62% 26.60% 27.66% 
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two-step procedure, where Lamda is the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the probit model in 
Table 1.4. In column (3), we estimate a two-boundary Tobit model, where the lower bound is 0 
and the upper bound is 1. We adjust standard errors or heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and 
acquirer clustering in all regressions.  
As shown in each column, the coefficient estimate of the local advisor dummy is negative 
and statistically at the 5% level. For example, in the Heckman model, the local advisor dummy 
has an estimated coefficient of -0.124 with a p-value of 0.017. Acquirers with local banks use 
12.4% less stock to finance the deal than other acquirers. This number is about one third of the 
standard deviation of the percentage of stock financing for the whole sample (39.7%). These 
results support our hypothesis that a bidder advised by a local bank has less incentive to use its 
stock as the financing method to share any risk of overpaying with target shareholders, since the 
local adviser can more accurately value the target assets and effectively reduce the probability of 
overbidding.  
For other control variables, we find that a bidder is more likely to use stock as the 
payment method when it has more free cash flow, its Q is high, and its stock performs well 
recently. We also document that bidders are more likely to issue stock to finance tender offers, 
deals with competing bidders, and acquisitions of targets that are large relative to bidder size.6 
  
3.5 The time to complete a deal 
 In the acquisition process, a financial advisor not only provides its opinion on the price 
that a bidder should pay for a target, but also helps design the transaction structure and payment 
terms, deals with government regulations, and sometimes even negotiates directly with the target. 
We expect that banks from the target country are in a better position than other banks in dealing 
                                                 
6 The results in this section indicate that the method of payment is a potentially endogenous variable in the 
CAR regression. To address this issue, in the CAR regression in Table 4, we replace the stock percentage 
variable with its predicted value from column 1 of Table 6. We find that the coefficient estimate of local 
advisor dummy is still positive and significant at better than 5% level.  
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with foreign takeover laws, structuring deals and negotiating with target.  This will facilitate the 
transaction process and reduce the amount of time from the initial announcement of the 
acquisition to the completion of the deal, diminishing the negative valuation effects resulted from 
any uncertainty about the deal going through. Therefore, we expect that, ceteris paribus, bidders 
assisted by local banks complete the transactions more quickly than those advised by non-local 
banks.  
We present the regression results in Table 1.7. The dependent variable is the log of the 
number of days from the announcement of the acquisition to the effective date as recorded in 
SDC. The independent variables are the same as those in column (2) of Table 1.3, except that we 
also add the announcement period abnormal returns in the regression. We expect that deals with 
higher bidder returns are completed more quickly than other deals. Since we have to focus on 
deals that are completed, the sample size reduces to 330.  
In all specifications, we control for target country fixed effects and year and Fama-French 
48-industry dummies. Column (1) reports OLS estimates without adjusting self-selection bias. 
Column (2) presents the results based on the Heckman two-step procedure, where Lamda is the 
inverse Mills ratio calculated from the probit model in Table 1.4. In column (3), we estimate a 
one-boundary Tobit model, where the lower bound is 0. We adjust standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and acquirer clustering. As shown in Table 1.7, the coefficient 
estimates of the local advisor dummy are negative and significant in all three specifications. This 
is consistent with our hypothesis that bidders advised by local banks take less time to complete 
the acquisitions.   
For other control variables, we document that the more complex the transaction is, the 
more time a bidder needs to complete the deal. For example, we find that acquisitions of larger 
targets, diversifying deals, deals with competing bidders, and tender offers tend to take more time 
to complete.  We also find the percentage of stock has a significantly negative coefficient 
estimate. This is consistent with Gilson (1986) who documents that a deal takes more time if the  
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Table 1.7. Regression analysis of the time to complete 
 
The sample consists of 382 mergers and acquisitions of foreign public targets by U.S. public firms between 
1990 and 2006 (listed in SDC).  The dependent variable is the log of the number of days from the 
announcement date to the date that a deal becomes effective. Local advisor is a dummy variable that is one 
if the acquirer’s financial advisor is in the same country as the target, and zero otherwise. Lamda is the 
inverse mill ratio calculated from the probit model in Table 1.4. Definitions of other independent variables 
are in Appendix 1.1. In parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(White (1980)) and acquirer clustering. a, b, and c stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficient estimates 
are suppressed for brevity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimation method OLS Heckman two-step Tobit 
Key Explanatory Variable:    
     Local advisor  -0.305 b -0.278 c -0.328 b 
 (0.041) (0.060) (0.032) 
Bidder Characteristics:    
      Log(assets) 0.136 a 0.133 a 0.142 a 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.002) 
      Tobin’s q -0.109 a -0.108 a -0.125 a 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      Free cash flow 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.978) (0.989) (0.904) 
      Leverage -0.828 -0.825 -0.941 c 
 (0.191) (0.194) (0.092) 
      Toehold 1.398 a 1.386 a 1.449 a 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      Past acquisition activity -0.052 -0.054 -0.025 
 (0.622) (0.612) (0.739) 
Deal  Characteristics:    
      CAR(-2,+2) -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.420) (0.419) (0.395) 
      Relative deal size 0.586 a 0.586 a 0.599 a 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      Percentage of stock 1.091 a 1.086 a 1.129 a 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      Diversifying acquisition 0.430 b 0.436 b 0.446 a 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.004) 
      Competed 0.386 b 0.378 b 0.396 c 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.064) 
      Hostile 0.203 0.198 0.209 
 (0.329) (0.344) (0.420) 
      Tender Offer 0.634 a 0.645 a 0.675 a 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Self-selectivity correction:    
      Lamda  -0.045  
  (0.559)  
      Target-country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 382 382 382 
Adjusted R2 41.49% 41.27% 24.81% 
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bidder’s stock is used as the financing method, since the acquirer normally need to register its 
securities and obtain shareholder approval. Finally, we find that larger acquirers, firms with 
higher Tobin’s q, and firms with higher toeholds tend to need more time to complete the 
transactions.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Financial intermediaries are specialists in information gathering and processing. In 
mergers and acquisitions, acquirers employ the services from financial institutions to reduce the 
uncertainty in pricing targets. Compared to domestic acquisitions, cross-border transactions are 
featured with higher level of asymmetric information between acquirers and targets about the 
value of target assets. In this paper, we use cross-border acquisitions made by U.S. firms to 
examine whether a financial advisor in the target’s home country possesses an informational 
advantage over other advisors. We expect that local advisors can value targets more accurately 
and help acquirers avoid overbidding. This will translate into higher stock returns for bidder 
shareholders around the acquisition announcement date.  
Our results show that U.S. bidders advised by local banks earn higher abnormal returns 
than other acquirers. The positive effect of local advisors is robust to controlling for other factors 
that have been shown to affect bidder returns, including bidder-, deal- and target country- 
characteristics.  We also examine the determinants of a bidder’s decision to hire a local advisor. 
We find that local banks are more likely in diversifying acquisitions, hostile deals, tender offers, 
and acquisitions of small firms and firms in countries with low accounting quality, where the 
asymmetric information problem is most acute. 
We also examine the acquirer’s choice of payment and find that acquirers advised by 
local banks use less stock as the financing method. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
local advisors can effectively reduce the asymmetric information problem and serve as another 
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mechanism for bidders to hedge against the risk of overpayment. Finally, we document that 
acquirers with local advisors complete deals more quickly than other acquirers.  
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Appendix 1.1. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Bidder cumulative abnormal returns  
CAR (-2,+2) 
5-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage) calculated using the 
market model. The market model parameters are estimated using the 
return data for the period (-210,-11). The market index is the CRSP 
value-weighted return. 
 
Panel B: Bidder characteristics 
Firm size Log of book value of total assets (item6) 
Market value of equity Number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the 11
th 
trading day prior to announcement date. 
Tobin’s Q Market value of asset over book value of asset: (item6-item60+item25*item199)/item6 
Leverage  Book value of debts (item34+item9) over book value of total assets (item6) 
Free Cash Flow 
Operating income before depreciation (item13)–interest expense 
(item15)–income taxes (item16)–capital expenditures (item128) –
change in working capital, scaled by deal value (from SDC). 
PPE Book value of property, plant, and equipment (item 8)scaled by book value of total assets (item6) 
Stock price runup Bidder’s buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) during the period (-210,-11). The market index is the CRSP value-weighted return. 
Toehold Bidder’s stock ownership in the target prior to acquisition announcement. 
Past acquisition experience The number of acquisitions made by the U.S. firm in the target country during past five years. 
 
Panel C: Deal characteristics 
Relative deal size Deal value (from SDC) over bidder’s market capitalization, defined above.  
Percentage of stock  Percentage of stock used in the transaction (from SDC), ranging from 0 to 1. 
Diversifying Dummy variable: 1 if bidder and target do not share a Fama-French (1997) industry, 0 otherwise. 
Competed Dummy variable: 1 for competed deals, 0 otherwise. 
Hostile Dummy variable: 1 for hostile deals, 0 otherwise. 
Tender offer Dummy variable: 1 for tender offers, 0 otherwise. 
  
 
Panel D: Target country characteristics (all target country information is taken from LLSV (1998)) 
Financial development Log of GNP per capita 
Shareholder protection The LLSV anti-director rights multiplied by scores of rules of law and divided by 10. 
Low accounting quality Dummy variable: 1 if the target country has an accounting rating below the sample median, 0 otherwise. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
ARE FOREIGN DIRECTORS EFFECTIVE MONITORS? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The separation of ownership and control results in conflicts of interest between managers 
and shareholders in public corporations (Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)). Monitoring by the board of directors is one important governance mechanism to ensure 
that a company is run in the interests of its shareholders. However, there are several concerns 
with the effectiveness of this mechanism. First, Jensen and Meckling’s agency theory highlights a 
fundamental weakness with boards of directors, namely, that directors, like managers, are agents 
expected to pursue their private interests, which at times will conflict with the interests of 
shareholders. Second, there is substantial empirical research showing that boards do not always 
act in shareholders’ best interests. This concern is especially serious for insider directors and to a 
lesser extent, outside directors with familial and financial ties to management, often termed “gray 
directors”. Generally speaking, the corporate governance literature considers outside directors 
without direct ties to senior management, commonly termed “independent directors”, the most 
effective monitors of management. However, the empirical evidence supporting this position is 
mixed.7 We conjecture that not all independent directors are equally effective monitors, consistent 
with a recent study by Fich and Shivdasani (2005). We extend their work by examining the 
effectiveness of foreign directors, rather than busy directors. 
Recent corporate scandals in the U.S. by large public companies such as Enron, Tyco, 
Adelphia, and Worldcom raise questions about what are the important characteristics that lead 
                                                 
7 We classify directors into inside directors, gray directors and independent directors. Inside directors are 
the company’s executives and officers. Gray directors generally have familial or financial ties to 
management. Independent directors are those who have no affiliations that may comprise their ability or 
incentives to perform oversight duties for the best interests of shareholder. Since the monitoring function of 
a board largely comes from independent directors, we only focus on them. 
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boards of directors to fulfill their fiduciary duties and safeguard shareholder interests. Table 2.1 
lists the names, primary employers, and home countries of Enron’s independent directors during 
fiscal years from 1997 to 2001, the period when Enron committed the high profile accounting 
fraud. On the surface, the board looks very strong from a management oversight perspective, with 
a large majority of directors being independent. One interesting aspect of the Enron board is that 
two independent foreign directors were on the board and they were both members of Enron’s 
audit committee during 1997-2001 when Enron committed serious earnings misstatements.8 This 
raises important questions about the effectiveness of the management oversight function 
performed by independent directors, and foreign directors in particular. 
Are foreign independent directors as effective monitors as domestic independent 
directors? What is the impact of foreign independent directors on firm value? How prevalent are 
foreign independent directors on the boards of U.S. public companies? Are there circumstances 
when appointing foreign independent directors is beneficial for firm performance? These are the 
key questions we explore in this study.  
 One important function of independent directors is to monitor senior management. 
Foreign independent directors may not be as effective monitors as U.S. independent directors for 
several reasons. First, substantial oversight costs associated with the long geographic distance 
between a director’s home and the company’s headquarter reduces foreign directors’ ability to 
closely monitor management. To effectively oversee senior management, directors have to 
commit their time to attend regular board meetings. These oversight costs are likely to increase if 
the director lives far away from the firm on whose board he or she sits. Consistent with this 
argument, Lerner (1995) finds that venture capitalists are less likely to sit on boards of distant 
portfolio firms. Similarly, the time and energy spent on cross-border travels are likely to place 
excessive burden on foreign directors, potentially undermining their incentives and ability to  
                                                 
8 As shown in Table 1, the two foreign directors are: Ronnie C. Chan, chairman of the Hang Lung Group in 
Hong Kong; and Paulo V. Ferraz Pereira, a senior executive of Group Bozano in Brazil. 
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Table 2.1. Enron’s independent directors during 1997-2001 
 
Director Name 
Years on 
board 
(till 2001) Primary Employment 
Country 
Origin 
On the audit 
committee 
during 1997-
2001 
     
Ronnie C. Chan 
1996-2001 
Hang Lung Group 
Hong Kong 
(China) 
Yes 
Paulo V. Ferraz Pereira 1999-2001 Group Bozano Brazil Yes 
Norman P.  Blake Jr. 1993-2001 Turnaround Specialist United States No 
Bruce Willison 1997-1999 H.F. Ahmanson Co. United States Yes 
Jerome J. Meyer 1997-2000 Tektronix Inc. United States No 
Robert K. Jaedicke 
 
1985-2001 
Professor at Graduate 
School of Business, 
Stanford University 
United States Yes 
Wendy L. Gramm 
 
1993-2001 
Economist, George Mason 
University 
United States Yes 
Frank Savage 
 
1999-2001 
Alliance Capital 
Management 
United States No 
John H. Duncan 1985-2001 Private investor in Houston United States No 
Charles A. Lemaistre 
 
1985-2001 
Anderson Cancer Center, 
University  of Texas 
United States No 
John Mendelsohn 
 
1999-2001 
Anderson Cancer Center, 
University  of Texas 
United States Yes 
Charles E. Walker 1985-1999 Walker & Walker LLC United States No 
Herbert S. Winokur Jr. 1985-2001 Capricorn Holdings Inc. United States No 
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effectively monitor senior management.9 Second, many foreign directors are not familiar with the 
accounting standards, laws and regulations in the U.S., and lack the necessary knowledge to 
evaluate and challenge senior managers’ decisions. Third, foreign director managers may be 
poorly versed in U.S. management methods, which may make it more difficult for them to 
evaluate the performance of U.S. senior managers. Fourth, if foreign directors come from 
countries with poor investor protections and weak standards of law enforcement, they may be 
insensitive to poor corporate governance policies. In contrast, directors residing in the U.S. are 
more likely to push for more rigorous corporate governance standards, given that the U.S. has 
stronger shareholder rights and higher law enforcement standards than most foreign countries (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), hereafter LLSV). In sum, we hypothesize 
that foreign directors contribute to less effective monitoring and disciplining of senior 
management, which enable managers to pursue their private benefits with less concern for the 
consequences. These increased agency costs are expected to lower firm performance. 
 Another important function of independent directors is to advise senior management on 
business strategies. Klein (1998) argues that firms’ economic needs determine who is appointed 
to sit on their boards. Some directors are placed on boards to address a firm’s needs for special 
expertise and proprietary information. In a recent study, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2005) 
emphasize the advisory role of non-executive directors and document that firms with greater 
advisory needs, such as complex firms and diversified firms, benefit from larger boards of 
directors. Similarly, firms may hire foreign directors to seek their advice on business strategies on 
foreign operations and to benefit from their social and political connections in these foreign 
countries. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) points out that some U.S. companies 
recruit foreign directors to benefit from their experience and expertise on foreign operations. 
                                                 
9 In an interview with Financial Times, Charles King, a managing director of Korn Ferry International (an 
executive search firm), comments on the logistical problem of hiring a foreign director-“To get some one to 
fly to New York for a board meeting six or seven times a year, even from London, takes at least 18 days 
out of their schedule.” 
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According to the WSJ article, Wal-Mart Stores Inc, which has 20% of its revenue from foreign 
operations, already has a foreign director sitting on its board, and is “actively searching” for a 
second non-U.S. director.10 In sum, the advisory services provided by foreign directors may 
especially benefit companies with foreign operations. Thus, one would expect a less negative or 
even a positive effect on firm performance from these foreign director appointments. We examine 
this issue and find much more favorable effects on firm value when the firm has substantial 
foreign operations. 
We examine the S&P 1500 firms from 1998 to 2003 and find that foreign independent 
directors are present in 14.6% of our sample firm-years.  Boards with foreign directors on average 
have one fifth of their independent directors drawn from foreign countries, representing 13% of 
all board members.  This is nontrivial percentage given that on average independent directors 
represent only 63% of board members. Thus, if foreign independent directors are less effective 
than their domestic counterparts, then the average proportion of active independent directors able 
to closely monitor management on shareholders’ behalf drops from 63% to 50%. 11 
To examine whether foreign independent directors are effective monitors, we conduct 
three tests. In the baseline test, we estimate a firm-level fixed effects regression of firm value on 
the extent that foreign independent directors are on the board. The results show that firms with 
foreign independent directors have lower firm value, proxied by Tobin’s Q. Moreover, Q is 
decreasing in the percentage of independent directors who come from foreign countries. The 
negative relation between foreign independent directors and Tobin’s Q is robust to controlling for 
other determinants of Q, including firm size, growth options, operating performance, leverage, 
ownership structure and other board characteristics. However, the negative relation between 
foreign directors and Q is partially mitigated when firms have substantial foreign operations. This 
                                                 
10  Lublin, “Globalizing the boardroom”, the Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2005.  
11  Fich and Shivdasani (2005) present evidence that busy directors are not effective monitors of 
management. Since on average 20% of firms’ independent directors are busy directors, when combined 
with foreign independent directors, the proportion of active independent directors able to closely monitor 
management drops to substantially below 50%. Detailed summary statistics are presented in Table 2.  
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evidence suggests that foreign directors may play a more beneficial advisory role under these 
circumstances. 
In further analysis of the relation between foreign directors and firm value, we rule out an 
alternative explanation for our empirical findings—reverse causality. It is possible that poorly 
performing managers appoint weak monitors, such as foreign directors, to entrench themselves. 
To investigate this possibility, we focus on the appointment of new independent directors and 
examine whether prior poor performance leads to the appointment of foreign independent 
directors. In a logit regression of 5,810 independent director appointments between 1998 and 
2003, we find that prior poor performance does not increase the likelihood of appointments of 
foreign directors. Therefore, the negative relation between foreign directors and firm value is 
unlikely to be driven by reverse causality.  
In our second test, we investigate how the attendance records of foreign independent 
directors at board meetings differ from those of domestic independent directors. We find that 
foreign directors are two times more likely to miss 25% or more board meetings than domestic 
directors. This evidence supports the argument that geographic separation of director offices from 
firms’ headquarters increases foreign directors’ oversight costs and weakens their incentives and 
ability to closely monitor senior management.  
Finally, we examine whether firms with foreign independent directors are more likely to 
misreport their earnings. The results show that firms with foreign independent directors are more 
likely to misstate earnings, and especially when they sit on board audit committees, where they 
would be unlikely to make a serious contribution to the oversight of the financial accounting 
reports. In summary, the evidence suggests that foreign directors are associated with weaker 
managerial monitoring and reduced effectiveness of the board as a corporate governance 
mechanism.  
Our study contributes to the literature on corporate governance by analyzing an important 
dimension of board qualities—the presence of foreign directors. Previous research has focused on 
 36
board independence as a proxy for board effectiveness and found mixed evidence of the 
importance of this board characteristic. 12, 13 Our study complements this literature by showing 
that independence is not enough to ensure effective monitoring and that additional director 
attributes contribute to the quality of oversight of a firm’s senior management.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates whether 
foreign independent directors are related to firm value. Section 3 presents the tests on board 
meeting attendance. Section 4 examines the effect of foreign independent directors on earnings 
restatements. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Baseline test—foreign directors and Tobin’s Q 
 
 Our primary test focuses on the relation between foreign directors and firm value. If 
foreign directors contribute to lax monitoring, managers are more likely to engage in shirking and 
self-dealings and these increased agency costs will reduce firm value. We use Tobin’s Q to 
measure firm value. The Q regression has been widely used in the corporate governance 
literature, including studies on the effects of ownership structure (Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Himmelberg, Hubbard and 
Palia, (1999)), board size (Yermack (1996)), busy boards (Ferris et. al. (2003), Fich and 
Shivdasani (2005)), founding family ownership (Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit 
(2005)),  and shareholder rights (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2004), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005)).  
                                                 
12 For example, see Weisbach (1988), Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Cotter, 
Shivdasani and Zenner (1997), Bhagat and Black (1999), and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003). 
13 Other papers on board include studies on CEO/Chairman duality (Goyal and Park (2002), Masulis, Wang 
and Xie (2007)), board meeting frequency (Vafeas (1999)), the directors and officers (D&O) liability 
insurance (Core (2000)), the stock-based compensations of directors (Perry (1999), Yermack (2004)), the 
related-party transactions between firms and their directors(Gordon, Henry and Palia (2004), Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew (2005)), and how busy the directors are (Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003), Fich and 
Shivdasani (2005)).  See Hermanlin and Weisbach (2003) for a survey of the literature.  
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2.1. Sample construction 
We start with the universe of firms in the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) director database, which covers firms in the S&P large-cap (500), mid-cap (400) and 
small-cap (600) indices. The sample period is from 1998 to 2003. Beginning in 1998, IRRC 
recorded a director’s primary employer and country of origin, the key information we use to 
identify foreign directors. The coverage of some other important director information, such as the 
director’s shareholding and the director’s committee affiliation, also started in 1998. We match 
the IRRC sample with Compustat to obtain company financial information. After excluding 
ADRs and firms incorporated in foreign countries, we have 7,533 firm-years in the sample.   
 
2.2. Variable definitions and summary statistics 
We calculate Tobin’s Q as the market value of assets over the book value of assets. 
Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Gompers et. al. (2003), the market value of assets is 
computed as the book value of total assets (Compustat item6) plus the market value of common 
stock (item25*item199) less the sum of the book value of common stock (item60) and balance 
sheet deferred taxes (item74).14 
All the director information is obtained from the IRRC director database. IRRC classifies 
directors into inside, gray and independent directors. Inside directors are the company’s 
executives and officers. Independent directors are those who have no affiliations that may 
compromise their ability or incentives to perform oversight duties for the best interests of 
shareholders. The remaining are gray directors.15  Since the monitoring function of the board 
                                                 
14 Erickson and Whited (2006) point out that elaborate algorithms for computing the replacement value of 
assets or market value of debts suffer from reduction in sample size and selection bias and add little to the 
measurement quality of this simple proxy of Q. 
15 According to IRRC, gray directors include “a former employee of the company or of a majority-owned 
subsidiary; a provider of professional services—such as legal, consulting or financial—to the company or 
an executive; a customer of or supplier to the company, unless the transaction occurred in the normal 
course of business; a designee under a documented agreement between the company and a group, such as a 
significant shareholder; a director who controls more than 50% of the company’s voting power (and thus, 
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largely comes from independent directors, we focus exclusively on whether foreign independent 
directors are effective monitors.   
We define foreign directors as individuals whose primary places of employment are 
outside the U.S. and its territories and retired individuals whose last places of employment were 
outside the U.S.16 We create two measures to capture the extent of foreign director presence. The 
first is an indicator variable, which is one if at least one foreign independent director sits on the 
board, and zero otherwise. The other is the percentage of independent directors who are foreign 
directors. We expect these two variables to be negatively associated with Tobin’s Q.  
The summary statistics are shown in Table 2.2 and based on all the 7,533 firm-year 
observations. During 1998 to 2003, 14.6% of the firm-year observations have at least one foreign 
independent director. The average percentage of foreign independent directors is relatively small 
due to the fact that nearly 85% of the observations have no foreign independent directors. 
However, among boards with foreign directors, on average, nearly one fifth of their independent 
directors come from foreign countries. A typical foreign board has one foreign independent 
director, and the number ranges from 1 to 4.  
In the Q regressions, we also control for other board attributes, firm ownership structure 
and firm characteristics that are documented in prior studies to affect firm value. The board 
characteristics we control for include board size, board independence, CEO/Chairman duality and 
percentage of busy independent directors, four attributes shown in prior work to affect how 
effectively a board functions. Yermack (1996) documents an inverse relation between board size 
and firm value. To capture this board size effect, we include the log of the number of directors on 
the board. While there is no consensus on whether a more independent board leads to better 
                                                                                                                                                 
would not be considered to represent the broader interests of minority shareholders); a family member of an 
employee; an interlocking directorship or an employee of an organization or institution that receives 
charitable gifts from the company”.   
16 We recognize that retired foreign directors may have part time homes in the U.S. and some domestic 
executive directors work for U.S. firms’ foreign divisions and thus are primarily based outside the U.S. We 
do not have information to further identify these cases. However, such cases would bias against our finding 
significant differences between foreign directors and domestic directors. 
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overall firm performance (Bhagat and Black (1999) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)), we 
nevertheless control for the percentage of independent directors in the Q regression so that our 
results are comparable to those in prior studies. Prior studies also find that firms which combine 
the positions of CEO and Chairman are less likely to act in the best interests of shareholders when 
replacing a poorly performing CEO (Goyal and Park (2002)) or making acquisitions (Masulis, 
Wang and Xie (2007)). We create an indicator that equals one if a firm’s CEO is also chairman of 
the board (COB), and zero otherwise.  Finally, Fich and Shivdasani (2005) find that firms with 
busy boards have lower firm value. To reflect this concern we include the percentage of 
independent directors that are busy. We define busy directors as individuals serving on three or 
more boards that belong to the IRRC universe. 17 
 In the Q regressions, we also control for firm ownership structure. Specifically, we 
include the percentage of a firm’s common stock that is held by all the executives who sit on the 
board. We expect it to have a positive coefficient (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Yermack (1996)), 
reflecting better incentive alignment with shareholders. To account for the potential nonlinearity 
between firm value and insiders’ share holdings (Morck et. al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes 
(1990)), we also include quadratic and cubic terms of insiders’ stock ownership. Finally, we 
include aggregate stock ownership held by blockholders who are also independent directors. 
Blockholders are those who own at least 5% of the firm. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that 
the presence of large shareholders can mitigate the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders, since investors holding a large block of shares have incentives to monitor the 
managers more intensively, overcoming the free-rider problem plaguing companies with diffuse 
ownership structures. The incentive to monitor should be particularly strong when a blockholder 
also sits on the board as an independent director. Therefore, we expect the aggregate stock 
ownership held by all independent director blockholders to be positively related to firm value.  
                                                 
17 This definition is slightly different from Fich and Shivdasani (2005) in that they count directorships in 
any publicly traded firms. 
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 Table 2.2. Summary statistics 
The sample consists of 7,533 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2003. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix 2.1. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Median 
 
Correlation 
with Foreign 
director 
Correlation 
with 
percentage 
of foreign 
independent 
directors 
      
Panel A: Board characteristics      
Foreign director (dummy variable) 0.15 0.35 0 1.00 0.84 a 
     (<0.01) 
Percentage of foreign independent 
directors 2.9% 8.3% 0% 0.84 
a 1.00 
    (<0.01)  
Percentage of foreign independent 
directors (when Foreign director=1) 19.6% 11.8% 16.7% 
-- -- 
Number of foreign independent 
directors (when Foreign director=1) 1.3 0.6 1 
-- -- 
Board size 9.5 3.0 9 0.17 a 0.07 a 
    (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Percentage of independent directors 63.3% 18.4% 66.7% 0.13 a 0.01 
    (<0.01) (0.27) 
CEO/Chairman duality (dummy 
variable) 0.64 0.48 1 0.01 -0.01 
    (0.55) (0.28) 
Percentage of independent busy 
directors 18.6% 22.0% 14.3% 0.14 
a 0.07 a 
    (<0.01) (<0.01) 
      
      
Panel B: Ownership Structure      
Inside directors’ stock holdings 6.8% 13.2% 1.9% -0.07 a -0.04 a 
    (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Independent director blockholder 
(dummy variable) 0.04 0.20 0 -0.01 -0.01 
    (0.56) (0.48) 
Independent director blockholders’ 
holdings 0.7% 4.3% 0% -0.001  -0.004 
    (0.90) (0.73) 
Number of independent director 
blockholders 0.05 0.28 0 0.01 -0.01 
    (0.53) (0.56) 
Independent director blockholders’ 
holdings (when independent director 
blockholder=1) 
16.6% 13.5% 12.0% -- -- 
      
Number of independent director 
blockholders (when independent 
director blockholder=1) 
1.3 0.6 1 
-- -- 
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Table 2.2.  (cont’d)      
 
 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics:      
Tobin’s Q 1.85 1.45 1.37 0.01 0.01 
    (0.52) (0.55) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 0.44 1.34 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 
    (0.50) (0.22) 
Total Assets (in millions) 13,600 64,594 1,717 0.13 a 0.08 a 
    (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Leverage  0.25 0.23 0.23 0.06 a 0.05 a 
    (<0.01) (<0.01) 
ROA 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.02 c 0.01 
    (0.08) (0.45) 
Industry-adjusted ROA 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.01 
    (0.31) (0.69) 
Growth Options 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.002 0.02 
    (0.84) (0.12) 
Foreign operations 0.19 0.23 0.08 0.18 a 0.18 a 
    (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Firm Age 24 19 18 0.14 a 0.07 a 
    (<0.01) (<0.01) 
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The firm characteristics we control for include firm size, return on assets (ROA), 
leverage, growth options, and foreign operations, all defined at the prior fiscal year-end. Firm size 
is defined as the natural log of total assets. ROA is EBITDA over total assets. Leverage is the 
book value of all debts over total assets. Since Tobin’s Q may also proxy for a firm’s investment 
opportunities, it is important to control for growth options in the Q regressions. We measure 
growth opportunities by capital expenditures over total assets. Using R&D as an alternative 
measure for growth options generates similar results.  
Finally, firms may hire foreign independent directors to obtain their advice on global 
expansion and foreign operations.  Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) present evidence that globally 
diversified firms trade at a discount. Therefore, without controlling for global diversification, any 
negative relationship between the presence of foreign directors and firm value may be spurious. 
We define the degree of global diversification as the proportion of a firm’s sales derived from 
foreign operations. Firms’ foreign sales are obtained from Compustat’s Geographic Segment 
data. 18 
 Appendix 2.1 presents the detailed definitions for all of the aforementioned variables and 
Table 2.2 reports their summary statistics. The typical firm in our sample has 9 directors sitting 
on its board, two thirds of which are independent directors. The CEO and Chairman are the same 
person in 64% of firm-years. On a median board, about 19% of independent directors are 
classified as busy directors. This number is lower than that reported by Fich and Shivdasani 
(2005). There are two possible explanations for this difference. First, IRRC only includes 
directorships in the S&P 1500 universe of firms, while Fich and Shivdasani  count directorships 
in any publicly traded firms. Second, Fich and Shivdasani focus on Forbes 500 firms, while 
IRRC primarily covers a broader range of firms in the S&P 1500 index. The Forbes 500 firms on 
average are much larger than the average firm in IRRC, and larger firms tend to hire more 
                                                 
18 U.S. firms are required to report geographic segments that account for 10% of consolidated sales, profits, 
or assets. For a detailed description of Compustat’s Geographic Segment data, please refer to Denis, et. al. 
(2002). 
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directors sitting on multiple boards. Panel B of Table 2.2 lists the summary statistics for the 
ownership variables. The median insider stock ownership is 2%. Independent director 
blockholders occur in only 4% of the sample.  Finally, the median firm has a Tobin’s Q of 1.37 
and obtains 8% of its total sales from foreign operations. 
 In the last two columns of Table 2.2, we also report the simple correlations between the 
explanatory variables and our two foreign director measures. Firms with larger board size and 
higher percentages of busy independent directors are more likely to have foreign directors. 
Furthermore, there is a negative correlation between foreign directors and insider ownership, and 
a positive correlation between foreign directors and firm size, leverage, age, and foreign 
operations.  
 
2.3. Regression Results 
 We use a firm-level fixed effects regression to control for unobservable firm 
characteristics that might simultaneously affect the likelihood of foreign directors and level of 
firm performance.  This approach is used by Himmelberg et. al. (1999) to examine the link 
between ownership and performance, and more recently, by Fich and Shivdasani (2005) to 
analyze the impact of busy boards on firm value.  Besides firm-level fixed effects, we also 
include year fixed effects in the regression models. To reduce the impact of outliers, we winsorize 
all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The results are shown in Table 2.3. In 
parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) 
and firm clustering. In model (1), the estimate for the foreign director indicator is -0.091 and is 
significant at the 10% level, suggesting that firms with foreign independent directors have lower 
Tobin’s Q than firms with only domestic independent directors. In model (2), the foreign director 
indicator is replaced with the percentage of independent directors who are from foreign countries. 
The coefficient of the foreign director percentage is negative and significant with a p-value of 
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0.023. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that foreign independent directors are 
related to lower firm value.  
As shown in Table 2.3, both the magnitude and statistical significance of the parameter 
estimates for the control variables across the four specifications are fairly stable and generally 
consistent with the findings in prior studies. For board characteristics, we find that the percentage 
of busy independent directors is significantly and negatively related to Tobin’s Q.  Board size is 
also negatively related to Tobin’s Q and is significant in two of the specifications. CEO/Chairman 
duality has a negative effect on Tobin’s Q, though it is statistically insignificant. Finally, the 
percentage of independent directors is not significantly related to Tobin’s Q.  
For the ownership variables, both the linear and cubic terms for insiders’ stock ownership 
have positive and significant coefficients, while the estimate of the quadratic term is negative and 
significant. The estimated coefficients of these three terms indicate that firm value is at first 
increasing in insiders’ share holdings up to 16%. Between 16% and 32%, firm value is negatively 
related to insiders’ ownership, suggesting the entrenchment effect starts to dominate the 
alignment effect. Above 36%, insider holdings have a positive effect on firm value again. This 
pattern is generally consistent with the nonlinear relation between board ownership and firm 
value documented by Morck et. al. (1998), except that the inflection points they find are 5% and 
25% respectively. The results in Table 2.4 also show that the aggregate stock ownership held by 
independent director blockholders is significantly and positively associated with Tobin’s Q. 
Finally, among firm characteristics, firms with better operating performance (ROA) have 
significantly higher Tobin’s Q, while firms with higher levels of foreign operations have 
significantly lower firm value. CapEx has a significant and positive coefficient, suggesting that 
firms with more growth options have higher market values.   
To test whether foreign independent directors play a positive advisory role among firms 
with foreign operations, we construct interaction terms between the two foreign director variables 
and the foreign operation measure. The regression results are presented in column (3) and (4) of 
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Table 2.3. In model (3), the coefficient of the interaction between the foreign director indicator 
and the foreign operation measure is positive and significant at the 10% level. More interestingly, 
the foreign director indicator is still negative and becomes more significant after controlling for 
the interaction term. The evidence suggests that the negative effect of foreign directors on firm 
value is partially mitigated if the firm has foreign operations. However, the parameter estimates 
suggest that only when a firm has more than 60% of total sales from foreign operations can the 
positive effect of foreign independent directors’ advisory services outweigh the negative impact 
of their weak monitoring. Since the mean of foreign operations in the entire sample is only 19%, 
the total effect of foreign independent directors on firm value, on average, is still negative. 
Furthermore, if a firm has no foreign operations, the negative incremental effect of foreign 
independent directors on firm value is much larger than that documented in model (1) of Table 
2.3.  
Similarly, in regression (4), the coefficient of the interaction term between the percentage 
of foreign independent directors and foreign operations is positive and significant. At the same 
time the coefficient on the percentage of foreign independent directors remains negative and 
becomes more significant (p-value decreases from 0.023 to 0.009). In summary, we uncover 
evidence that foreign independent directors can play a valuable advisory role in firms with 
substantial foreign operations, which potentially mitigates the negative impact of foreign directors 
on firm value.19  
 
                                                 
19 Compustat classifies firms’ geographic segments into seven regions, i.e. Europe, Asia, Africa, Pacific, 
South America, Middle East, North America, and Other Foreign. We group a foreign director’s home 
country into one of these seven regions and find that if a firm has a foreign independent director and at the 
same time operating activities in foreign countries, in 93% of the cases, the foreign director comes from the 
same region where the foreign operations are located. We create a dummy variable for such cases and 
interact this variable with foreign operations. We find that the estimated coefficient is very similar to that of 
the interaction between foreign director indicator and foreign operations, both economically and 
statistically. We choose to use the latter one, because it is possible that even though the foreign director 
does not come from the same region where the firm’s foreign operations are located, he or she may still 
have expertise and information advantages over domestic directors due to culture and historical reasons. 
For instance, a director from France may be familiar with the local culture and market conditions of an 
African country that is a former colony of France. 
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Table 2.3. Fixed effects regressions of Tobin’s Q 
 
The sample consists of 7,533 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2003. The dependent variable is the 
firm’s Tobin’s Q. Variable definitions are in Appendix 2.1. In parentheses are p-values based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and firm clustering. a, b, and c stand for statistical 
significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control 
for firm fixed effects and year fixed effects, whose coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Key Explanatory Variables:     
  Foreign director -0.091 c  -0.167 b  
 (0.077)  (0.022)  
  Percentage of foreign independent directors  -0.556 b  -0.866 a 
  (0.023)  (0.009) 
  (Foreign director * Foreign operations)   0.266 c  
   (0.100)  
   1.086 c   (Percentage of foreign independent directors  
  * Foreign operations)    (0.080) 
Other board Characteristics:     
  Percentage of independent directors -0.052 -0.073 -0.046 -0.070 
 (0.628) (0.499) (0.673) (0.514) 
  Percentage of independent busy directors -0.186 b -0.188 b -0.183 b -0.185 b 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.043) (0.041) 
  CEO/Chair duality -0.028 -0.027 -0.029 -0.027 
 (0.213) (0.233) (0.212) (0.237) 
  Log(board size) -0.107 -0.115 c -0.109 -0.117 c 
 (0.121) (0.096) (0.117) (0.091) 
Ownership Structure:     
 Inside directors’ stock holdings 3.030 a 2.988 a 3.021 a 2.980 a 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
 (Inside directors’ stock holdings) 2 -13.852 b -13.693 b -13.855 a -13.669 b 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
 (Inside directors’ stock holdings) 3 19.176 b 19.009 b 19.195 b 18.987 b 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
 Independent director blockholders’ holdings 0.402 c 0.400 c 0.395 c 0.391 c 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.055) (0.058) 
Firm  Characteristics:     
  Foreign operations -0.248 b -0.251 b -0.314 a -0.315 a 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006) 
  Log(total assets) (in millions) -0.554 a -0.553 a -0.552 a -0.553 a 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Leverage -0.246 -0.246 -0.246 -0.246 
 (0.270) (0.270) (0.270) (0.270) 
  ROA 1.602 a 1.603 a 1.600 a 1.594 a 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Growth Options 0.746 a 0.736 b 0.747 a 0.740 b 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
  Firm Age 0.356 0.361 0.350 0.354 
 (0.498) (0.493) (0.507) (0.502) 
Number of Obs. 7,533 7,533 7,533 7,533 
Adjusted R2 76.68% 76.70% 76.69% 76.71% 
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2.4. Treating Canadian directors as U.S. directors 
 In this subsection, we classify Canadian directors as equivalent to U.S. domestic 
directors. There are two reasons to conduct this additional test. First, Canada is adjacent to the 
U.S. Since most major Canadian cities are near the U.S. border, the oversight costs due to 
geographic distance are much less of an issue for Canadian directors than for directors from other 
countries. Second, Canada shares many similarities with the U.S. in terms of culture, political and 
economic systems, commercial laws, shareholder protections, and accounting standards. For 
example, both America and Canada are common-law countries; both countries have the same 
level of shareholder rights index and similar accounting disclosure quality; and both countries 
have strong systems of law enforcement (LLSV(1998)). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
directors who come from Canada are as effective in monitoring U.S. managers as domestic 
directors. After we treat Canadian directors as domestic directors, the proportion of firm-years 
with at least one foreign independent director sitting on the board drops from 14.6% to 12.5%.  
Table 2.4 presents the regression results of this reclassification of Canadian directors. As 
shown in column (1) and (2) of Table 2.4, the negative relation between the two foreign director 
variables and Tobin’s Q becomes more pronounced, both economically and statistically. For 
example, the coefficient on the foreign director indicator is -0.144 (p-value=0.019), compared to -
0.091 (p-value=0.077) in Table 2.3; and the coefficient on the percentage of foreign independent 
directors is -0.670 (p-value=0.010), compared to -0.556 (p-value=0.023) in Table 2.3. In column 
(3) and (4) of Table 2.4, we also control for the interactions between the two foreign director 
variables and foreign operations. The coefficient estimates on these interactions are larger in 
magnitudes and statistically more significant than those presented in Table 2.3. For other control 
variables, the estimates and significance levels are very similar to those reported in Table 2.3.  
In summary, the initial conclusion concerning the effect of foreign directors on firm value 
is strengthened when Canadian directors are treated as equivalent to U.S. domestic directors. This 
suggests that directors from Canada share clear similarities with U.S. domestic directors in the  
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Table 2.4. Fixed effects regressions of Tobin’s Q: Treating Canadian directors as U.S. directors 
 
The sample consists of 7,533 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2003. The dependent variable is the 
firm’s Tobin’s Q. Variable definitions are in Appendix 2.1.  In parentheses are p-values based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and firm clustering.  a, b, and c stand for statistical 
significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control 
for firm fixed effects and year fixed effects, whose coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Key Explanatory Variables:     
  Foreign director -0.133 b  -0.237 b  
 (0.019)  (0.003)  
  Percentage of foreign independent directors  -0.670 a  -1.156 a 
  (0.010)  (0.002) 
  (Foreign director * Foreign operations)   0.351 b  
   (0.039)  
   1.487 b   (Percentage of foreign independent directors  
  * Foreign operations)    (0.030) 
Other board characteristics:     
  Percentage of independent directors -0.062 -0.074 -0.041 -0.062 
 (0.583) (0.495) (0.703) (0.583) 
  Percentage of busy independent directors -0.186 b -0.188 b -0.181 b -0.184 b 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.045) (0.043) 
  CEO/Chair duality -0.028 -0.027 -0.028 -0.026 
 (0.221) (0.242) (0.222) (0.254) 
  Log(board size) -0.105 -0.115 c -0.106 -0.117 c 
 (0.130) (0.090) (0.126) (0.090) 
Ownership Structure:     
 Inside directors’ stock holdings 3.040 a 2.983 a 3.035 a 2.969 a 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
 (Inside directors’ stock holdings) 2 -13.896 b -13.674 b -13.930 a -13.631 a 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) 
 (Inside directors’ stock holdings) 3 19.230 b 18.991 b 19.293 b 18.952 b 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
 Independent director blockholders’ holdings 0.399 c 0.405 b 0.387 c 0.396 c 
 (0.052) (0.050) (0.060) (0.055) 
Firm  Characteristics:     
  Foreign operations -0.246 b -0.249 b -0.325 a -0.336 a 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.005) (0.004) 
  Log(total assets) (in millions) -0.553 a -0.552 a -0.552 a -0.550 a 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Leverage -0.246 -0.246 -0.246 -0.247 
 (0.270) (0.270) (0.270) (0.270) 
  ROA 1.604 a 1.607 a 1.599 a 1.598 a 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Growth Options 0.746 a 0.730 b 0.747 a 0.731 b 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
  Firm Age 0.356 0.361 0.349 0.352 
 (0.498) (0.492) (0.508) (0.504) 
Number of Obs. 7,533 7,533 7,533 7,533 
Adjusted R2 76.70% 76.71% 76.71% 76.73% 
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effectiveness of monitoring management. Treating them in the same way as other foreign 
directors lowers the power to detect the effect of foreign directors on firm value. On the other 
hand, this evidence also reinforces our hypothesis that higher oversight costs due to large distance 
and lack of strong governance skills or awareness appear to undermine foreign directors’ ability 
to effectively monitor U.S. managers.  
 
2.5. Other sensitivity tests 
As a robustness check, we use a different calculation of Tobin’s Q. Following Smith and 
Watts (1992), we compute the numerator, which represents the market value of total assets, as the 
book value of total assets (Compustat item 6) plus the market value of common stock (item 
25*item 199) less the book value of common stock (item 60). The regression results are very 
similar to those presented in Table 2.4. We also use industry-adjusted Q and the results are 
qualitatively similar.20 
As an alternative measure of firm performance, we also consider accounting based 
measures. Specifically, we use the annual return on assets (ROA), which is defined as EBITDA 
(item 13) over the book value of total assets (item 6), as the dependent variable. However, the 
estimated coefficients for the foreign director indicator and the percentage of foreign independent 
directors are not significant. The t-statistics are never greater than one. We also use different 
definitions of ROA, including the ratio of EBIT over total assets, net income over total assets, and 
their industry-adjusted forms. These alternative measures also yield insignificant results for 
foreign director variables. One possible explanation for the lack of significance in the ROA 
regressions is that accounting numbers are very short-term in nature and more vulnerable to 
managerial manipulation. In section 4, we do find that firms with foreign independent directors 
are more likely to misstate their earnings, which is consistent with this concern. 
                                                 
20 A firm’s industry-adjusted Q is defined as its raw Q minus the median Q in the firm’s Fama-French (48) 
industry in the observation year.  
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Finally, the negative relation between Tobin’s Q and foreign directors is robust to: (i) 
measuring firm size by net sales (item 12) or market value of assets; (ii) measuring growth 
options by R&D over total assets; (iii) replacing aggregate stock ownership held by all 
independent director blockholders with the number of independent director blockholders or with 
an indicator variable that is one if there is at least one independent director blockholder; (iv) 
excluding firms in financial and utility industries; (v) replacing the CEO/Chair duality indicator 
variable with another indicator that is equal to one if a non-employee serves as Chairman of the 
board, and zero otherwise; (vi) replacing the level of foreign operations with an indicator that is 
equal to one if the firm has foreign operations, and zero otherwise. 
 
2.6. Endogeneity 
The firm-level fixed effects regression only controls for potential omitted variables. 
However, another form of endogeneity problem, reverse causality, is still left unaddressed. An 
alternative explanation for the prior results is that poorly performing managers appoint ineffective 
monitors, such as foreign directors, to entrench themselves. If this is the case, then the conclusion 
should be that it is a lower Tobin’s Q that leads to the appointment of foreign directors to the 
board. To address this possibility, we use a logit model to examine which factors contribute to the 
appointment of foreign independent directors.  
The IRRC database provides the year in which the director begins his or her board 
service. Using this information, we examine 5,810 independent director appointments from 1998 
to 2003. Among these newly appointed independent directors, 181 (approximately 3%) come 
from foreign countries. The null hypothesis is that poor performance measured by past Tobin’s Q 
is associated with more foreign director appointments. In the logit regression model, the 
dependent variable is one if a foreign independent director is appointed and zero if a domestic 
independent director is appointed.  
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Table 2.5. Probability of foreign independent director appointments 
 
Model (1) uses 5,810 independent director appointments in which the appointing firm has available 
financial data. Model (2) uses 3,579 independent director appointments in which the appointing firm also 
has board data during the year before the appointment. The dependent variable is 1 if an foreign 
independent director is appointed, 0 if a domestic independent director is appointed. Other variable 
definitions are in Appendix 2.1. In parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and firm clustering.  a, b, and c stand for statistical significance based on 
two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects 
and Fama-French industry fixed effects, whose coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm  Characteristics:     
      Q t-1 -0.005 -0.06 -0.017 -0.023 
 (0.857) (0.827) (0.649) (0.538) 
      Q t-2  0.002  0.009 
  (0.939)  (0.774) 
      Log(total assets) (in millions) 0.273 a 0.273 a 0.128 0.128 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.118) (0.119) 
      Leverage -0.813 -0.812 -0.319 -0.313 
 (0.115) (0.116) (0.552) (0.562) 
      Foreign operations 1.352 a 1.352 a 2.107 a 2.105 a 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
      Firm Age 0.004 0.004 0.012 b 0.012 b 
 (0.362) (0.362) (0.015) (0.015) 
     
Appointee’s Characteristics:     
      CEO 0.050 0.050 -0.109 -0.108 
 (0.782) (0.782) (0.649) (0.651) 
      Old director -0.692 -0.692 -0.131 -0.129 
 (0.330) (0.330) (0.854) (0.856) 
-0.417 a -0.417 a -0.312 b -0.312 b       Number of other IRRC  
      board memberships (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.020) 
     
Board Characteristics:     
      Percentage of independent directors   -1.085 c -1.085 c 
   (0.089) (0.089) 
      Percentage of busy independent directors   1.250 b 1.248 b 
   (0.048) (0.048) 
      CEO/Chair duality   -0.264 -0.264 
   (0.210) (0.210) 
      Log(board size)   0.152 0.157 
   (0.693) (0.685) 
     
Ownership Structure:     
      Inside directors’ stock holdings   -0.732 -0.733 
   (0.579) (0.579) 
      Independent director blockholders’ holdings   0.144 0.144 
   (0.713) (0.712) 
Number of Obs. 5,810 5,810 3,579 3,579 
Peudo-R2 8.47% 8.47% 11.29% 11.29% 
 52
The explanatory variables in the logit model include the appointing firm’s financial 
characteristics and governance structure for the year before the appointment, and the appointee’s 
personal characteristics at the time of appointment.  Firm financial characteristics include firm 
size, leverage, foreign operations, and, most importantly, Tobin’s Q, all measured in the year 
prior to the appointment year.  The governance variables are the same as those in the Tobin’s Q 
regressions in Table 2.3. Finally, the foreign director’s personal characteristics may also affect the 
probability that a new board membership is offered and accepted. For example, if a foreign 
director is as busy as a domestic director, i.e. they have the same number of other board 
memberships, the domestic director is more likely to be favored over the foreign director. This 
follows because the foreign director has to spend more time and energy on the cross-border trips, 
making the position more costly to perform from the foreign director’s perspective. Other director 
characteristics that we control for are: (i) a “senior” director indicator (directors who are 70 or 
more years old); (ii) and an indicator if the director is CEO of another firm.  
The logit model estimates are reported in Table 2.5. Model (1) and (2) use data on all the 
independent director appointments. Model (3) and (4) present regression results based on a 
subsample in which board structure information for the recruiting firm is available during the 12 
months prior to when the new director joins the board. This second restriction reduces the sample 
size to 3,579 new appointments, among which 111 (approximately 3%) are appointments of 
foreign independent directors. In both regressions, we control for year and Fama-French 48 
industry dummies. 
In the first two specifications, we only include the Tobin’s Q of the fiscal year preceding 
the appointment, i.e. 1−tQ . In regression (3) and (4), we also control for 2−tQ . As shown in Table 
2.6, neither 1−tQ  nor 2−tQ  has a significant coefficient estimate in any of the four specifications. 
Therefore, prior performance does not appear to contribute to the appointment of a foreign 
independent director. In all the regressions, the coefficient estimates of foreign operations are 
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positive and highly significant, suggesting that firms hire foreign directors because of their 
expertise on foreign operations.  
Among other firm characteristics, firm size also has a positive and significant coefficient 
in the first two regressions. For the appointee’s characteristics, we find that the number of other 
IRRC board memberships reduces a foreign director’s chance of joining the board. This is 
consistent with the conjecture that higher oversight costs make a busy foreign director 
unattractive. Alternatively, busy foreign directors may be reluctant to join a U.S. board due to 
time commitment. Finally, the results from the last two specifications show that a board with a 
lower percentage of independent directors and a higher percentage of busy directors is more 
likely to hire a foreign director. 
As a robustness check, we use alternative measures of a firm’s past performance, 
including industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, raw ROA, and industry-adjusted ROA. None of these 
measures has a significant coefficient. We also classify Canadian directors as U.S. domestic 
directors and re-estimate the logit regressions. Again, past performance measures do not have 
significant coefficients. In summary, it is unlikely that poor prior performance leads to the 
appointment of foreign independent directors, i.e. the negative relation between foreign 
independent directors and firm value is unlikely to be the result of reverse causality.  
We also recognize a specific endogeneity issue associated with firm fixed effects models, 
i.e. within-firm board composition changes might be endogenous. For example, when a U.S. firm 
successfully acquires a relative large foreign target, some directors from the target board normally 
join the board of the U.S. firm. If the addition (or reduction) in the numbers of foreign 
independent directors is due to large foreign acquisitions, then the negative effects documented in 
the previous sections may just reflect the impact of these acquisitions on firm performance. To 
rule out this alternative explanation, we obtain a list of bidders from SDC that acquired at least 
one foreign target during our sample period. We also require that deal value exceeds 5% of the 
bidder’s size, so that some target board members are likely to be appointed to the board of the 
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combined firm. There are a total of 167 acquiring firms during 1998 to 2003. We exclude these 
companies from our sample firms and re-estimate the Q regressions in Table 2.3 and obtain very 
similar results (unreported, but available on request). Therefore, the negative relation between 
foreign independent directors and firm performance is unlikely to be the result of large foreign 
acquisitions.  
 
3. Board meeting attendance 
 
 In this section, we conduct another more direct test to assess whether foreign independent 
directors are effective monitors. Specifically, we focus on directors’ attendance records at board 
meetings. Foreign directors conceivably have information disadvantages over domestic directors, 
because when they join the board of a U.S. firm, they must face different market conditions, 
unfamiliar accounting standards, and U.S. laws and regulations. One way for foreign directors to 
alleviate the asymmetric information problem and more effectively fulfill their duties to monitor 
management is to regularly attend board meetings. However, the long geographic distance 
substantially increases the time and energy spent by a foreign director commuting to the 
meetings. This higher transportation cost creates a disincentive for foreign directors to regularly 
attend board meetings and undermines their ability to closely monitor senior management. 
Indeed, a director’s attendance record has been used by institutional investors to evaluate a 
director’s performance. Directors who are unable to attend regular board meetings are often 
criticized as being ineffective monitors by institutional shareholders and other business 
commentators. 
 U.S. publicly listed firms are required to disclose a director’s board meeting attendance 
record in their annual proxy filings. However, firms are only required to list the directors who 
attended less than 75 percent of board meetings during the past fiscal year. This information is 
also recorded in the IRRC director database. We focus on the attendance records of all 
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independent directors and create a variable that is one if the independent director attended less 
than 75 percent of board meetings during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. We use this 
indicator as the dependent variable and conduct a logit regression.  The key explanatory variable 
is an indicator for foreign independent directors. We also include an indicator variable for 
directors from Canada. The unit of observation for the logit regressions is director-firm-year. We 
exclude any directors who have recently joined the board within the last 12 months. These newly 
appointed directors inevitably miss some board meetings within the appointment year even 
though they may attend all meetings after joining the board. By requiring firms to also have 
financial data available from Compustat, we further reduce our sample to 44,660 director-firm-
year observations. 
 In Panel A of Table 2.6, we first present a comparison of the characteristics of foreign 
independent directors and domestic independent directors. As shown in the first row, 7% of 
foreign independent directors attend less than 75% of board meetings, while 3% of domestic 
independent directors fall into this category.  The difference is significant at 1% level. We also 
assess the differences in other director characteristics, including director age, number of IRRC 
board memberships, CEO director, and director stock ownership. The table shows that there is no 
significant difference in director age. However, on average, foreign directors are more likely to be 
the CEOs of other firms, though economic difference is rather small (21% of domestic directors 
compared to 23% of foreign directors). In addition, U.S. directors on average hold 0.3 more IRRC 
directorships than foreign directors. Finally, foreign directors’ stock ownership is significantly 
less than that of domestic directors.21 
 
 
                                                 
21 This difference may be due to the difference in firm size. Large firms tend to hire foreign directors and 
directors in large firms hold less stock than directors in small firms because of wealth constraints. We also 
compare the foreign directors’ stock ownership to that of domestic directors sitting on the same board. The 
difference is not significantly different from zero, both for the mean and median test. 
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Table 2.6. Probability of attendance at board meetings 
 
The sample consists of 44,660 director-firm-year observations from 1998 to 2003. Panel A presents the 
characteristics comparison between foreign independent directors and domestic director. a, b, and c stand for 
statistical significance based on tests of difference in means or medians. Panel B presents the results of the 
logit regression analysis of determents of board meeting attendance. Model (1) uses all the 44,660 director-
firm-year observations. Model (2) uses 33,776 director-firm-year observations which the firm has board 
structure information during the past year. The dependent variable is 1 if the independent director attended 
less than 75 percent of board meetings during the fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Other variable definitions are in 
Appendix 2.1. In parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 
(1980)) and firm clustering.  a, b, and c stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects and Fama-French industry 
fixed effects, whose coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity. 
 
Panel A:  Director characteristics comparison 
 
Domestic 
directors (1) 
Foreign 
directors 
 (2) 
Difference 
 (2)-(1) 
Mean 0.03 0.07 0.04 a 
Missing board meetings (=1 if the 
director attends less than 75% of the 
board meetings during the fiscal 
year) Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mean 60.02 59.80 -0.22 Director Age 
Median 60.00 60.00 0.00 
Mean 1.81 1.51 -0.30 a Total directorships in IRRC firms 
Median 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Mean 0.21 0.23 0.02 b CEO director (=1 if the director is the 
CEO of another firm) 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mean 0.17% 0.08% -0.09% b Director stock ownership in the firm 
Median 0.02% b 0.01% -0.01% a 
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Table 2.6. (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: logit regression   
 (1) (2) 
Independent Director’s Characteristics:   
      Directors from foreign countries 1.254 a 1.170 a 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
      Directors from Canada -0.896 -0.914 c 
 (0.107) (0.100) 
      Old director -0.030 -0.067 
 (0.774) (0.563) 
0.122 a 0.105 a       Number of IRRC  
      board memberships (0.000) (0.004) 
      CEO director 0.415 a 0.361 a 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
      Director stock ownership  0.633 0.095 
 (0.690) (0.968) 
Firm  Characteristics:   
      Log(total assets) (in millions) -0.078 b -0.209 a 
 (0.011) (0.000) 
      Leverage 0.242 0.459 c 
 (0.286)  (0.069) 
      Tobin’s Q -0.002 -0.012 
 (0.858) (0.542) 
      ROA -0.379 -0.292 
 (0.295) (0.496) 
      Firm age -0.007 a -0.010 a 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
Board Characteristics:   
      Percentage of independent directors  0.339 
  (0.232) 
      Percentage of busy independent directors  0.252 
  (0.261) 
      CEO/Chair duality  -0.035 
  (0.700) 
      Log(board size)  1.380 a 
  (0.000) 
Ownership Structure:   
      Inside directors’ stock holdings  0.810 a 
  (0.003) 
      Independent director blockholdings  -0.822 
  (0.458) 
   
Number of Obs. 44,660 33,776 
Peudo-R2 2.89% 4.12% 
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Panel B of Table 2.6 presents logit model estimates. In model (1) we use the entire 
sample, i.e. all the 44,660 director-firm-year observations in which firm financial data is available 
for the fiscal year when the director’s attendance is recorded. Model (2) is based on 33,776 
director-firm-year observations in which the firm also has available board data. In both 
specifications, the estimated coefficients of the indicator for directors from foreign countries are 
positive and highly significant, suggesting that foreign directors are more likely to miss board 
meetings than domestic directors. However, among foreign directors, directors from Canada are 
less likely to miss board meetings, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of 
Canadian director indicator in column (2). For directors’ other characteristics, we find that 
directors who are also CEOs of other firms and directors who have a higher number of other 
board memberships are more likely to miss board meetings.  This is consistent with the argument 
that CEO-directors may be more distracted by the day-to-day operations in their own firms 
(Booth and Deli (1996)) and directors sitting on several boards are more likely to over-commit 
their time, which undermines their ability to closely oversee senior management (Fich and 
Shivdasani (2005)).22  
Among firm characteristics, we observe that independent directors in large firms and/or 
older firms have better attendance records than those in small and/or young firms. Large and/or 
older firms are subject to more scrutiny from news media, security analysts and institutional 
investors and thus, the reputation costs of missing regular board meetings for individual directors 
are higher.23 Alternatively, large and old firms may have the ability to attract better independent 
directors, who commit to consistently showing up at regular board meetings. The estimated 
coefficient of leverage is insignificant in the full sample, but is positive and significant for the 
                                                 
22 We discover one source of costs of hiring a CEO-director or a director sitting on multiple boards. On the 
other hand, CEO-directors might be valuable because of their unique expertise and talents (Fich (2005)). 
Busy directors might also benefit the firm if the number of directorships measures a director’s experience 
and reputation (Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003)).  
23 These costs include a higher probability to be dismissed and the lost meeting fees which tend to be much 
higher in large firms than in small firms. 
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smaller sample. A possible explanation for the positive coefficient is that leverage acts as another 
governance mechanism and it is a substitute for intensive monitoring by independent directors.  
Of the board characteristics and ownership structure variables included in model (2), only board 
size and aggregate stock ownership held by insiders have significant coefficients. Specifically, 
independent directors sitting on large boards have a higher propensity to miss board meetings 
than those sitting on small boards. This result complements prior evidence that the free-riding 
problem is more acute on large boards than on small boards (Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen 
(1993), Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998)). The coefficient estimate for 
aggregate insider stock ownership is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
senior managers with greater stock ownership are more aligned with shareholders and hence 
require less intensive board monitoring. 
Finally, we recognize that attending regular board meeting is not a sufficient condition 
for an independent director to be an able monitor. This is especially true when the CEO controls 
the flow of information before and during board meetings. Of course, independent directors can 
seek more information by visiting the company headquarters and meeting with other senior 
managers (Lerner (1995)). However, these actions represent substantial oversight costs, 
especially for foreign directors who face much more travel time to the firm’s headquarters, as 
suggested by the poor board meeting attendance records.  
 
4. Foreign directors and earnings restatements 
 
As a further test of the monitoring effectiveness of foreign directors, we next examine 
whether the presence of foreign directors increases a firm’s propensity to misreport earnings. 
Managers have incentives to overstate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, increase the 
value of their stock and stock option holdings, and avoid being fired due to bad performance.  
 60
We obtain a list of firms that have recently restated their financial statements from a 
report compiled by The General Accounting Office (GAO). 24  The GAO report lists 919 
restatement announcements by all U.S. companies for the period from January 1997 to June 2002. 
Firms in this list restated their financial reports due to accounting irregularities. Burns and Kedia 
(2005) extend this list for S&P 1500 firms through the end of 2002. The GAO report provides the 
names of restating firms and the year during which the restatements are announced. We obtain the 
fiscal years and quarters that were misreported and the direction of the restatements from Burns 
and Kedia (2005).25 We match the restatement sample with the IRRC director database to obtain 
195 firm-years with misreported earnings. This approximately represents 3% of the 6,004 firm-
years, which is similar to the percentage of misstatement firm-years reported by Burns and Kedia 
(266 misreporting firm-years out of a sample of 8,208 firm-years).  
To examine what factors have impacts on misreporting, we use a logit model and present 
the regression results in Table 2.7. The dependent variable is one if a firm misreported earnings 
during the firm-year, and zero otherwise. In model (1), the key explanatory variable is the foreign 
director indicator. Its coefficient is positive and highly significant. In model (2), the foreign 
director indicator is replaced with the percentage of foreign independent directors. The estimated 
coefficient for this variable is also positive and significant. These results suggest that firms with 
foreign independent directors sitting on boards are more likely to misreport earnings. 
In model (3), we construct a second indicator variable that is one if at least one foreign 
independent director sits on the audit committee at the time of misstatement and zero otherwise. 
The primary function of the audit committee is to oversee a firm’s financial reporting process. 
Therefore, a foreign director sitting on the audit committee may have a greater impact on 
misreporting. As shown in column (3), the foreign audit committee indicator also has a positive 
                                                 
24 For a detailed discussion of the GAO data, please refer to Burns and Kedia (2005). Burns and Kedia 
examine the effect of CEO’s equity-based compensation on misreporting and obtain their restatement 
sample primarily from the GAO report.   
25 We thank Natasha Burns and Simi Kedia for kindly sharing their data. 
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coefficient that is significant at the 1% level. Finally, in model (4) we control for the percentage 
of audit committee members who are foreign independent directors. The estimated coefficient of 
this variable is 1.766 and is significant at below the 5% level.  
To measure audit committee independence, we include an additional indicator variable 
that equals one if all the audit committee members are independent directors, and zero otherwise. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Bill, passed in October 2002, specifically requires U.S. public firms to have 
their audit committees comprised entirely of independent directors. However, consistent with 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005), the estimated coefficient for the audit committee independence 
indicator is not significant in any of the four specifications. This may reflect the fact that 
independence is not closely correlated with accounting expertise and monitoring intensity.26 
The remaining control variables are identical to those included in previous regressions. 
Ownership variables and other board characteristics are not significantly related to the likelihood 
of a firm misstating its earnings. For firm characteristics, we find that larger firms, older firms 
and firms with higher debt levels have a higher propensity to misreport.27, 28  
In summary, firms with foreign independent directors and firms with foreign independent 
directors on their audit committees are more likely to misreport their earnings. This additional 
evidence supports the hypothesis that foreign directors are associated with lax monitoring of 
senior management and a failure to prevent aggressive accounting reporting practices. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that firms whose boards or audit committees have an independent 
director with financial expertise are less likely to restate earnings.  
27 Firms with higher leverage have incentives to overstate their earnings to avoid violating debt covenants.  
28 Misreporting does not necessarily mean overstating earnings. Firms may also understate their earnings, 
e.g., for tax purposes. Consistent with Burns and Kedia (2005), we find around 7% of the restatements 
involve understating earnings. Excluding these understatements does not result in statistically significant 
changes for the estimates of foreign director variables. 
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Table 2.7. Probability of earnings restatements and foreign independent directors 
 
The sample consists of 6,004 firm-years, 195 of which are restating-firm-years. The dependent variable is 1 
if the firm misreported earnings during fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. Other variable definitions are in 
Appendix 2.1. In parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 
(1980)) and firm clustering.  a, b, and c stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects and Fama-French industry 
fixed effects, whose coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Board Characteristics:     
      Foreign director 0.563 b    
 (0.013)    
      Percentage of foreign independent directors  1.662 b   
  (0.017)   
  0.604 b        Foreign independent director  
       on audit committee   (0.031)  
   1.766 b       Percentage of audit committee members 
      who are foreign independent directors    (0.020) 
     
      100% independent audit committee 0.238 0.240 0.228 0.220 
 (0.222) (0.220) (0.240) (0.259) 
      Percentage of independent directors -0.538 -0.373 -0.447 -0.414 
 (0.342) (0.508) (0.427) (0.461) 
      Percentage of busy independent directors -0.560 -0.563 -0.538 -0.508 
 (0.414) (0.404) (0.431) (0.454) 
      CEO/Chair duality -0.099 -0.108 -0.107 -0.103 
 (0.566) (0.531) (0.536) (0.550) 
      Log(board size) -0.484 -0.401 -0.421 -0.406 
 (0.221) (0.313) (0.286) (0.304) 
Ownership Structure:     
      Inside directors’ stock holdings -1.170 -1.112 -1.115 -1.093 
 (0.136) (0.154) (0.155) (0.162) 
      Independent director blockholdings 1.317 1.375 1.430 1.390 
 (0.253) (0.250) (0.246) (0.258) 
Firm  Characteristics:     
      Log(total assets) (in millions) 0.147 c 0.159 b 0.158 c 0.164 b 
 (0.071) (0.048) (0.051) (0.043) 
      Leverage 0.746 c 0.755 c 0.752 c 0.751 c 
 (0.085) (0.083) (0.082) (0.084) 
      Tobin’s Q -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.831) (0.928) (0.860) (0.880) 
      ROA 0.226 0.236 0.202 0.238 
 (0.767) (0.760) (0.792) (0.759) 
      Foreign operations -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.509) (0.493) (0.453) (0.356) 
      Firm age 0.013 b 0.014 b 0.013 b 0.013 b 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.027) (0.023) 
Number of Obs. 6,004 6,004 6,004 6,004 
Peudo-R2 7.74% 7.58% 7.62% 7.62% 
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines how the presence of foreign independent directors influences the 
effectiveness of monitoring by board of directors. We document the frequent presence of foreign 
independent directors on the boards of the S&P 1500 firms from 1998 to 2003. Specifically, we 
find that foreign independent directors are present in about 14.6% of the firm-years. Boards with 
foreign directors on average have one fifth of all their independent directors drawn from foreign 
countries. We find evidence that foreign directors are associated with lower firm value and 
weaker monitoring of management. 
Foreign directors appear to be less effective monitors of management for several reasons.  
They face substantial oversight costs that are associated with the long travel distances and they 
are likely to lack adequate knowledge and understanding of U.S. accounting standards, laws and 
regulations. Using firm-level fixed effects regressions, we find that companies with foreign 
independent directors exhibit weaker firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q and our firm 
performance measure is decreasing in the percentage of independent directors drawn from foreign 
countries. However, the negative relation between foreign directors and Tobin’s Q is mitigated 
when firms have foreign operations, suggesting that foreign directors can play a valuable advisory 
role when these firms have significant foreign operations. We also find that prior poor 
performance of these firms does not contribute to the appointment of foreign directors, suggesting 
that the negative relation between foreign directors and Tobin’s Q is unlikely to be a result of 
reverse causality.  
We further examine the potential causes for the weak performance of firms with foreign 
independent directors. We show that foreign directors have a higher probability of missing a 
significant portion of board meetings than domestic directors, which is consistent with these 
directors monitoring senior management less consistently or intensely. Furthermore, firms with 
foreign directors, and especially when they sit on the audit committees, are more likely to 
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misreport earnings. Taken as whole, this evidence suggests that foreign directors are less effective 
monitors of management and are less effective shareholder representatives, at least when firms 
lack substantial foreign operations.  
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Appendix 2.1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Board characteristics 
Percentage of foreign independent 
directors 
The percentage of independent directors who comes from 
foreign countries. 
Foreign director (dummy variable) 1 if the board has at least one foreign independent director, and 0 otherwise. 
Board size The number of directors sitting on board. 
Percentage of independent directors The percentage of directors who are independent. 
CEO/Chairman duality (dummy variable) 1 if CEO is also the Chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
Percentage of busy independent directors The percentage of independent directors who hold 3 or more other directorships in the IRRC universe firms. 
 
Panel B: Ownership Structure 
Inside directors’ stock holdings The aggregate percentage ownership held by all executives who sit on the board. 
Independent director blockholder  
(dummy variable) 
1 if an independent director is also a blockholder, and 0 
otherwise. Blockholders are investors with at least 5% share 
ownership in the firm. 
Independent director blockholdings 
Aggregate share ownership percentage held by all 
individual blockholders who are also independent directors. 
Blockholders are investors with at least 5% share ownership 
in the firm. 
 
Number of independent director 
blockholders 
The number of individual blockholders who are also 
independent directors. Blockholders are investors who have 
at least 5% ownership of the firm. 
 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
Tobin’s Q Market value of asset over book value of asset: (Compustat item 6 - item 60 + item 25 * item 199) / item 6. 
 
Firm size Log of total assets (in millions).  
 
Leverage  
Book value of debts over book value of total assets: (item 
34 + item 9)/ item 6. 
 
ROA 
Operating income before depreciation (item 13), scaled by 
book value of total assets (item 6). 
 
Growth options 
Capital Expenditures (item 128), scaled by book value of 
total assets (item 6). 
Foreign operations 
Proportion of net sales that come from the operations in 
foreign countries. The data is from the Compustat Segment 
database. 
 
Firm Age 
 
Number of years since the first date appearing in CRSP. 
 
Panel D: Director  characteristics 
CEO (dummy variable)  1 if the director is the CEO of some other firm, 0 otherwise. 
Director’s age Director’s age at proxy statement date. 
Old director  (dummy variable) 1 if the director is over 70, 0 otherwise. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TRANSFER AND SYNERGISTIC GAINS FROM 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Do acquisitions of poorly managed targets by well managed bidders create more value 
than others? The question is central to one of the most important sources of synergistic gains from 
mergers and acquisitions, i.e., the benefits of changes in control. Yet previous research does not 
provide us with a definitive answer. Early studies by Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and 
Servaes (1991) present evidence consistent with an affirmative answer – that the synergy of an 
acquisition is increasing in the bidder’s Tobin’s Q and decreasing in the target’s Tobin’s Q – with 
the premise that Q can be interpreted as a measure of how well a firm is run. However, results 
from recent academic endeavors suggest otherwise. For example, Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and 
Noah (2005) find that the bidder’s Q has a negative effect while the target’s Q has no impact on 
acquisition synergy, and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and Dong, Hirshleifer, 
Richardson, and Teoh (2005) find that the bidder’s Q and its close surrogates such as the market-
to-book ratio have negative effects on bidder returns. 
In light of the conflicting evidence, we approach the opening question in an alternative 
way by employing a measure that is more fundamental than Tobin’s Q to capture how well a firm 
is managed. As Dong et al. (2005) point out, Tobin’s Q is subject to the influences of (i) agency 
problems, (ii) investment opportunities, and (iii) market misvaluation.29 Therefore, it is important 
to isolate the agency component from the other two in order to have a clean examination of the 
                                                 
29  Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) also recognize that Tobin’s Q may reflect market misvaluation. 
Accounting-based performance measures will be jointly affected by the first two factors.  
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above question, especially when the investment-opportunity interpretation has the same 
prediction regarding the effect of Tobin’s Q on acquisition synergy as the agency perspective 
does.30 We use corporate governance metrics to proxy for the strength of managerial incentives or 
the severity of agency problems. For reasons discussed later, we focus on the shareholder rights 
or anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) adopted by each firm and stipulated in its charter/bylaws. 
Recent research finds that firms with stronger shareholder rights or fewer ATPs are associated 
with higher market value (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003, GIM), Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2004, BCF), and Bebchuk and Cohen (2004, BC)) and better operating performance 
(Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2005)). A hypothesis that GIM propose for these findings is that anti-
takeover provisions cause agency costs “through some combination of inefficient investment, 
reduced operational efficiency, or self-dealing”, which is supported by a number of studies 
examining the effects of ATPs on investment profitability  (Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2006)), 
operational efficiency (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)), and executive compensation 
(Borokhovich, Brunarsky, and Parrino (1997), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), and 
Fahlenbrach (2004)).31 
In a merger or acquisition that is accompanied by a change in control, the acquirer’s 
shareholder rights will apply to the combined company, in effect replacing the target’s 
shareholder rights. Therefore, after the transaction the target’s assets will be controlled by 
managers governed by the acquirer’s shareholder rights. When the acquirer has stronger 
shareholder rights than the target, the change in control will result in an improvement in corporate 
                                                 
30 When a bidder with good investment opportunities acquires a target with poor investment opportunities, 
the combination may create value because after the transaction, the target’s assets will be used to exploit 
the better investment opportunities available to the bidder. To the extent that growth opportunities can be 
both industry-specific and firm-specific, industry-adjusted Q is not immune to this criticism. 
31 Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2006) find that managers protected by more ATPs make acquisitions that 
destroy bidder shareholder value, a major form of empire building and investment inefficiency. Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2003) find that the passage of state-level anti-takeover legislations leads to higher 
employee wages, slowdown of new plant opening and old plant closing, and declines in overall 
productivity and profitability at firms incorporated in law-passing states, evidence of reduced efficiency. 
Borokhovich, Brunarsky, and Parrino (1997), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Fahlenbrach (2004) 
show that the pay setting process at firms with more ATPs tends to favor executives at the expense of 
shareholders. 
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governance at the target. Such an acquisition leads to a better use of target assets and creates more 
value.32 The reverse is true when the acquirer has weaker shareholder rights than the target. 
Therefore, we expect the synergy or the total value generated by an acquisition to be an 
increasing function of the difference in the strength of shareholder rights between the acquirer 
and the target. In other words, the stronger the acquirer’s shareholder rights relative to the 
target’s, the higher the acquisition synergy, ceteris paribus. 
The evidence from a sample of 396 completed domestic acquisitions by U.S. firms 
between 1990 and 2004 supports our conjecture. We use the corporate governance index 
constructed by GIM as our primary measure of the strength of a firm’s shareholder rights, and 
find that the difference in the strength of shareholder rights between the acquirer and the target 
has a positive effect on acquisition synergy, calculated as the announcement-period abnormal 
return of a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target following the methodology of 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988). This result holds for alternative shareholder-rights indices we 
consider and it is robust to controlling for other determinants of acquisition synergy. We also find 
that both the target’s and the acquirer’s abnormal returns increase with the difference in 
shareholder rights, suggesting that target shareholders and acquirer shareholders share the 
benefits of changes in control, or more precisely, the valuation effects of changes in corporate 
governance.  
We also examine the operating performance change of the acquirer and the target as a 
combined company from prior to an acquisition to after an acquisition. We find that the 
shareholder-rights difference has a significant and positive effect on the operating performance 
change of the combined company. This is consistent with our abnormal stock return-based 
evidence and further supports our hypothesis. 
                                                 
32 A better use of target assets can take the form of making profitable investments, improving the operating 
efficiency of existing assets, or reducing managerial self-dealing behavior or expropriation of shareholder 
wealth.  
 73
Our paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we provide a more definitive 
answer to the question whether takeovers of poorly managed targets by well run acquirers 
generate more synergies. By focusing on one aspect of a firm’s corporate governance system 
rather than Tobin’s Q, we are able to better identify the effect of agency problems separately from 
the confounding effects of investment opportunities and market misvaluation. Our evidence 
suggests that one possible source of synergistic gains from mergers and acquisitions is the 
improvement in corporate governance effected by changes in control. In this sense, our paper also 
contributes to the discussions on how mergers and acquisitions generate synergy. It is well 
received in the literature that takeovers of the 1980s create value by addressing the agency 
problem and eliminating managerial inefficiencies. Our results suggest that the M&A activities in 
the 1990s and the first half of this decade are capable of generating efficiency gains in a similar 
fashion through corporate governance transfers from acquirers to targets.  
Second, our paper represents an alternative approach to investigating the valuation effect 
of shareholder rights. Most studies in this area such as GIM, BCF, and BC rely on cross-sectional 
or within-firm time-series variations in shareholder rights. Since such variations could be 
endogenous, it is difficult to establish causality based on the evidence from these studies. Our 
tests can be interpreted as examining how changes in firms’ shareholder rights affect firm value, 
and more specifically, how changes in target shareholder rights affect target firm value. The 
changes that we exploit result from targets being taken over by other companies, and thus 
represent exogenous shocks to targets. This exogenous nature helps us circumvent the 
endogeneity problem and allows us to draw causality inferences from our evidence. Our findings 
of positive effects of target governance changes on acquisition synergy and takeover 
premium/target abnormal returns indicate that stronger shareholder rights indeed lead to higher 
firm value, reinforcing the evidence in GIM, BCF, and BC. 
Our analysis is the first attempt to examine in a domestic setting how differences in 
corporate governance between targets and acquirers affect the value creation by mergers and 
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acquisitions. Two recent papers by Bris and Carbolis (2005) and Starks and Wei (2004) link 
country-level corporate governance to the wealth effects of cross-border M&A transactions. 
These two studies differ in their hypothesis, sample selection and experimental design, and 
perhaps not surprisingly, report different results. Bris and Carbolis find that takeover premiums in 
cross-border deals are increasing (decreasing) in the level of shareholder protection and the 
quality of accounting standards in the acquirer’s (target’s) country and that the pattern holds only 
when target nationality changes. In contrast, Starks and Wei fix target country-level corporate 
governance by using a sample of acquisitions of U.S. targets by foreign acquirers, and find that 
the better the foreign acquirer’s country-level corporate governance, the lower the takeover 
premium. 33  Our sample of domestic acquisitions by U.S. firms enables us to remove any 
difference in country-level governance between acquirers and targets and to cleanly identify the 
effect of differences in firm-level corporate governance, an element that has been missing from 
the aforementioned papers in the international context. We also focus our hypothesis and analysis 
on the total returns or synergy of an acquisition, since neither target returns nor acquirer returns 
can fully capture the valuation effects of corporate governance differences if the effects are 
shared by targets and acquirers. 
Before we move on to the empirical part of the paper, it is important that we explain why 
we focus on shareholder rights. Our choice is driven by the observation that acquirers’ 
shareholder rights provisions do not change during acquisitions, and will apply to the combined 
companies as a result of the transactions. This is not the case for other aspects of firms’ corporate 
governance system. For example, both the board size and the board composition of acquirers 
prior to acquisitions could be substantially different from those of the combined companies, 
                                                 
33 Two papers that are somewhat related to Bris and Carbolis (2005) and Starks and Wei (2004) are 
Kuipers, Miller, and Patel (2003) and Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2005). Like Starks and Wei, Kuipers, 
Miller, and Patel also look at a sample of acquisitions of U.S. targets by foreign acquirers, but their focus is 
on how acquirer country’s legal environment mitigates the manager-shareholder agency problem at 
acquirers. Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar study acquisitions of emerging-market targets by developed-market 
acquirers, but they do not bring country-level corporate governance into their analysis. 
 75
especially for large acquisitions. The managerial equity ownership at acquirers could also change 
as a result of the transactions, since acquirers often issue new shares to finance their purchases.34 
In other words, the post-acquisition corporate governance along these dimensions at the 
combined companies is a function of deal characteristics. Therefore, potential attempts to 
examine the valuation effects of changes in targets’ corporate governance along these dimensions 
from pre-acquisition to post-acquisition would be fraught with endogeneity bias.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data source 
and sample construction. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Sample description 
 
We extract our acquisition sample from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. A total of 396 acquisitions between January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 2004 meet the following criteria:  
(1) The acquisition is completed. 
(2) The bidder controls less than 50% of the shares of the target prior to the announcement 
and owns more than 50% of the target after the transaction.35 
(3) The deal value disclosed in SDC is more than $1 million and is at least 1% of the 
acquirer’s market capitalization measured on the 6th trading day prior to the 
announcement date.36 
                                                 
34 This is especially true for acquisitions in our sample, 88% of which are at least partially financed with 
stock.  
35 This criterion ensures that the acquisitions in our sample result in changes in control. We find very 
similar results using several lower change-in-control thresholds, as we discuss in more detail in the 
sensitivity tests.  
36 We borrow the $1 million deal value threshold from Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). But this 
constraint is not binding, since the targets in our sample are from the IRRC universe, which consists mostly 
of large companies (see Table 1 for the summary statistics on the target’s market capitalization).  
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(4) Both the bidder and the target have annual financial statement information available from 
COMPUSTAT and daily stock return data (210 trading days prior to acquisition 
announcements) from CRSP. 
(5) Both the bidder and the target are included in the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) database of anti-takeover provisions.37 
There have been seven IRRC publications (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 
2004). They include detailed information on the anti-takeover provisions at approximately 1,500 
firms in each of the 7 publication years, with more firms added in recent publications. As GIM 
point out, these firms are large companies from the S&P 500 and annual lists of the largest 
corporations compiled by Fortune, Forbes, and BusinessWeek. The IRRC expanded the sample in 
1998 to include smaller firms and firms with high levels of institutional ownership. Following 
GIM, we assume that during the years between two consecutive publications, firms have the same 
anti-takeover provisions as in the previous publication year. We obtain very similar results 
(unreported, but available upon request) when we use the shareholder rights in the post-
acquisition publication year for the bidders or when we require that bidders have the same 
shareholder rights in both the pre-acquisition publication year and the post-acquisition publication 
year.38 
In Table 3.1 we present the distribution by announcement year of our sample of 
acquisitions. Starting from the early 1990s, the number of acquisitions in each year increases 
steadily until it reaches its highest levels in 1998 and 1999. Then it drops off significantly before 
rebounding in 2003. This trend is generally consistent with the trend of overall acquisition 
activities documented by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). Table 3.1 also reports the 
annual mean and median bidder and target market capitalizations prior to the acquisition, and the 
ratio of the target market capitalization to the bidder market capitalization. Since we require that 
                                                 
37 GIM, BCF, and BC all exclude firms with dual-class shares from their studies, which we do as well. 
38 For targets, we have to use their shareholder rights in the pre-acquisition publication year, since they will 
drop out of the IRRC coverage after being acquired.  
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both the bidder and the target are in the IRRC database, the market values of both parties are 
much higher than those reported in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). The average 
(median) ratio of the target’s size to the acquirer’s size is about 1/3 (1/5). 
 
Table 3.1. Sample distribution by announcement year 
 
The sample consists of 396 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 and 
2004. Both the bidder and the target are covered by the IRRC anti-takeover provision database prior to 
the acquisition. Both the acquirer market capitalization and the target market capitalization are measured 
at the 6th trading day prior to the announcement date. 
 
Year Number of acquisitions 
Percentage 
of sample 
Mean acquirer 
market cap ($mil) 
(Median) 
Mean target market 
cap ($mil) 
(Median) 
Mean market cap 
ratio 
(Median) 
      
1990 8 2.02 6,732.34 1,001.13 0.19 
   (2,133.30) (459.59) (0.17) 
1991 14 3.54 3,004.47 637.40 0.24 
   (2,041.99) (264.94) (0.13) 
1992 13 3.28 4,168.09 453.21 0.14 
   (2,821.70) (489.56) (0.11) 
1993 9 2.27 3,370.97 1,246.07 0.38 
   (3,159.56) (680.87) (0.32) 
1994 20 5.05 5,763.20 932.64 0.34 
   (3,033.56) (361.72) (0.22) 
1995 28 7.07 6,918.40 1,801.84 0.40 
   (4,893.96) (1,231.04) (0.35) 
1996 21 5.30 10,848.03 3,567.93 0.33 
   (5,948.40) (1,163.24) (0.27) 
1997 35 8.84 13,652.68 2,331.75 0.30 
   (5,487.32) (10,89.00) (0.18) 
1998 63 15.91 18,282.46 6,051.94 0.41 
   (7,708.17) (1,694.90) (0.30) 
1999 63 15.91 19,371.27 3,753.58 0.33 
   (5,264.96) (974.85) (0.21) 
2000 40 10.10 23,468.90 3,617.94 0.30 
   (9,405.25) (1,106.48) (0.10) 
2001 26 6.57 17,055.07 3,462.67 0.31 
   (6,000.35) (1,395.63) (0.17) 
2002 10 2.53 67,875.79 6,119.03 0.14 
   (14,254.98) (1,108.29) (0.04) 
2003 23 5.81 24,408.51 3,194.20 0.28 
   (7,135.65) (1,194.93) (0.18) 
2004 23 5.81 17,512.33 4,421.35 0.35 
   (6,608.39) (1,452.07) (0.28) 
Total 396 100.00 16,647.44 (5,484.02) 
3,405.36 
(1,059.25) 
0.32 
(0.21) 
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3. Empirical results 
 
3.1. Variable construction 
In the next three subsections, we discuss the measurement of three categories of 
variables: acquisition synergy, target return/takeover premium, and acquirer return as our 
dependent variables, the difference in shareholder rights between the acquirer and the target as 
our key explanatory variable, and bidder-, target- and deal-specific characteristics as control 
variables.  
 
3.1.1. Dependent variables 
We measure acquisition synergy in percentage returns using the methodology developed 
by Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988). For each acquisition, we form a value-weighted portfolio of 
the bidder and the target, with the weights based on their respective market capitalizations at the 
6th trading day prior to the initial announcement of the acquisition. We adjust the target’s weight 
by subtracting from the target’s market capitalization the value of target equity held by the bidder 
prior to the acquisition announcement. The acquisition synergy is defined as the portfolio’s 
cumulative abnormal return during an event window. We measure the portfolio abnormal returns 
by market-model adjusted returns around initial acquisition announcements. We obtain the 
announcement dates from SDC’s U.S. Mergers & Acquisitions database. We use the CRSP value-
weighted return as the market return and estimate the market model parameters over the period 
from event day -210 to event day -11, where event day 0 is the acquisition announcement date. 
Finally, following Bradley et al. (1988) and Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989), we compute 11-
day portfolio cumulative abnormal returns (PCAR) over the event window (-5, +5). We also 
separately calculate the 11-day cumulative abnormal returns for the target (TCAR) and the 
acquirer (ACAR). For 391 acquisitions in our sample, we are able to obtain from SDC the 
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takeover premium (PREM), which is defined as the ratio of offer price to the target’s stock price 
one week prior to the initial acquisition announcement minus one. 
As shown in Panel A of Table 3.2, the average 11-day PCAR for the whole sample is 
0.97%, significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Recent studies such as Andrade, 
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Bhagat et al. (2005), and Moeller et al. (2004) also document 
positive combined returns. The mean 11-day CARs for the target and the acquirer are 21.52% and 
-2.91%, respectively, both highly significant. This is consistent with existing evidence that M&A 
transactions are value-increasing for target shareholders (Bradley et al. (1988), Lang et al. (1989), 
and Dong et al. (2005)) and value-decreasing for acquirer shareholders when the targets are 
public companies (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2001) and Moeller et al. (2004)). On average 
PREM is higher than TCAR, which is similar to what Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) find. 
The most likely reason is that target returns incorporate the probability of an acquisition falling 
through. In the ensuing analysis, we use both target returns and takeover premiums to measure 
target shareholder gains. 
 
3.1.2. Shareholder-rights differences 
The IRRC publications cover 24 unique anti-takeover provisions, from which GIM 
construct a shareholder-rights index by adding one point for each provision that enhances 
(weakens) managerial power (shareholder rights). Firms with higher GIM indices are viewed as 
having weaker shareholder rights since it is more difficult and costly for shareholders to remove 
managers at these firms. GIM find that firms with higher indices or weaker shareholder rights are 
associated with lower firm value. BCF build on GIM and create a more parsimonious index based 
on six key anti-takeover provisions, which include staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, limits to shareholder charter amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, 
poison pills, and golden parachutes. Finally, BC focus on whether a firm has a staggered board 
and find that the market assigns lower valuations to firms with staggered boards. 
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Table 3.2. Summary statistics 
 
The sample consists of 396 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 and 
2004. Both the bidder and the target are covered by the IRRC anti-takeover provision database prior to the 
acquisition. PCAR is the 11-day cumulative abnormal return for a value-weighted portfolio of the bidder 
and target return around the announcement date. TCAR is the 11-day target cumulative abnormal return 
around the announcement date. PREM is the premium of offer price to target trading price 1 week prior to 
the announcement date. ACAR is the 11-day acquirer cumulative abnormal return around the 
announcement date. Other variable definitions are in the Appendix 3.1. In Panel A,  a, b, and c stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation Q1 Median Q3 
 
Panel A: Total returns, target returns/premiums, and acquirer returns 
PCAR (%) 0.97 b 8.27 -3.80 0.56 b 6.08 
TCAR (%) 21.52 a 21.65 7.55 17.88 a 31.60 
PREM (%) 32.84 a 25.76 16.02 29.74 a 46.55 
ACAR (%) -2.91 a 8.20 -7.79 -2.78 a 2.53 
 
Panel B: Shareholder-rights difference 
Bidder GIM 9.71 2.68 8 10 12 
Target GIM 9.41 2.81 7 10 12 
GIM difference (Target GIM – Bidder GIM) -0.30 3.72 -3 0 2 
 
Panel C: Bidder characteristics 
Log(bidder’s market cap) 8.75 1.38 7.81 8.61 9.66 
Bidder’s Q 2.01 1.51 1.14 1.51 2.32 
Bidder’s leverage 0.25 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.34 
Bidder’s return on assets (ROA) 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.19 
 
Panel D: Target characteristics 
Log(target’s market cap) 7.03 1.40 5.99 6.97 7.94 
Target’s Q 1.66 1.08 1.09 1.29 1.77 
Target’s leverage 0.25 0.18 0.10 0.25 0.38 
Target’s return on assets (ROA) 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.16 
      
Panel E: Deal characteristics      
Market cap ratio (target/bidder) 0.32 0.35 0.08 0.21 0.46 
Tender offer (dummy) 0.16 0.37 0 0 0 
Diversifying acquisition (dummy) 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 
All cash deal (dummy) 0.12 0.32 0 0 0 
Competed (dummy) 0.06 0.23 0 0 0 
Hostile (dummy) 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 
Merger of equals (dummy) 0.06 0.23 0 0 0 
High-tech combination (dummy) 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 
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Our key explanatory variable is the difference in shareholder rights between the acquirer 
and the target calculated using the GIM index.39 More precisely, it is computed as the target’s 
GIM index minus the acquirer’s GIM index. The difference is positive when the acquirer’s GIM 
index is lower than the target’s, or equivalently, when the acquirer’s shareholder rights are 
stronger than the target’s. The higher the difference, the stronger the acquirer’s shareholder rights 
relative to the target’s, and the more efficiency the acquirer would be able to squeeze out of the 
target’s assets. Therefore, we expect the shareholder-rights difference to have a positive effect on 
acquisition synergy. We also examine how the synergistic gains due to shareholder-rights 
differences are divided between acquirers and targets. Because of the competition among 
acquirers in the market for corporate control, most of the gains would usually accrue to target 
shareholders. However, in some deals, there is also competition among targets, and in some other 
transactions, bilateral negotiations prevail. Therefore, it is possible that acquirers will capture 
some of the synergistic gains as well. 
The summary statistics in Panel B of Table 3.2 indicate that the bidders and the targets in 
our sample are fairly representative of the IRRC universe in that their mean and median GIM 
indices are similar to what GIM report for the IRRC universe. The shareholder-rights difference 
is close to zero at both the mean and the median, but its standard deviation is quite large. The 
correlation matrix in Table 3.3 shows that the shareholder-rights difference is positively 
correlated with acquisition synergy (PCAR), target returns (TCAR), takeover premiums (PREM), 
and acquirer returns (ACAR).  
 
 
 
                                                 
39 We obtain very similar results when we compute the shareholder-rights difference based on the BCF or 
BC index, since the shareholder-rights differences based on the three indices are highly correlated with 
each other. Pair-wise correlation coefficients are 0.740 for GIM difference and BCF difference, 0.474 for 
GIM difference and BC difference, and 0.644 for BCF difference and BC difference, all significant at the 
0.1% level. These results are available upon request.  
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Table 3.3. Correlation matrix 
 
The sample consists of 396 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 and 
2004. Both the bidder and the target are covered by the IRRC anti-takeover provision database prior to 
the acquisition. PCAR is the 11-day cumulative abnormal return for a value-weighted portfolio of the 
bidder and target return around the announcement date. TCAR is the 11-day target cumulative abnormal 
return around the announcement date. PREM is the premium of offer price to target trading price 1 week 
prior to the announcement date. ACAR is the 11-day acquirer cumulative abnormal return around the 
announcement date. GIM difference is the difference between target GIM index and acquirer GIM index. 
Variable definitions are also in the Appendix 3.1. P-values are in parentheses.  
 
 PCAR TCAR PREM ACAR 
TCAR 0.429    
 (0.000)    
PREM 0.192 0.817   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
ACAR 0.863 0.235 -0.011  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.835)  
GIM difference 0.145 0.091 0.096 0.080 
 (0.004) (0.071) (0.057) (0.113) 
 
 
3.1.3. Control variables 
We build on studies such as Bradley et al. (1988), Lang et al. (1989), Servaes (1991), and 
Bhagat et al. (2005) and control for a number of bidder, target, and deal characteristics. The 
bidder and target attributes that we consider are firm size, Tobin’s Q, leverage, and ROA, all of 
which are measured at the fiscal year end prior to an acquisition announcement. The deal 
characteristics include the method of payment, the industry relatedness of an acquisition, the 
relative size of the target to the acquirer, whether an acquisition is a tender offer, whether a deal is 
a merger of equals (MOE), and whether a deal is between two companies from high-tech 
industries defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004). Appendix 3.1 contains the definitions of these 
variables, and Table 3.2 presents their summary statistics. Sixteen percent of the acquisitions in 
our sample are in the form of tender offers, 26% are diversifying, 88% involve at least some stock 
financing, 6% are competed deals, 4% are hostile, 6% are classified as mergers of equals, and 
15% are combinations of high-tech companies.  
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We have conjectures on the relations between a few explanatory variables and acquisition 
synergy. In light of the univariate results in Moeller et al. (2004), we expect that larger bidders 
make acquisitions that generate lower synergy. We also expect a cash-financed acquisition to 
generate higher total returns than a stock-financed acquisition, because stock being used as M&A 
currency sends a negative signal to the market about the acquirer’s stock and thus drives down the 
acquirer’s stock price (Myers and Majluf (1984) and Travlos (1987)). This negative abnormal 
return experienced by the acquirer is unrelated to the value creation by the merger, but is 
nevertheless picked up by the total abnormal returns, which we use to measure acquisition 
synergy. Therefore, we follow the convention in the literature and control for a deal’s method of 
payment in order to separate the signaling effect from the value created by the transaction. There 
is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that mergers of equals, e.g., the 1998 merger of Daimler-
Benz and Chrysler, often fail to generate much synergy. Combinations of high-tech companies 
are also likely to generate lower synergy, since it is difficult for technology companies to 
integrate smoothly due to the importance of human capital and intellectual property at these 
companies, which are often lost with increased employee turnover (Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2006)). 
However, for other control variables, we do not have clear-cut predictions regarding their 
effects on acquisition synergy. For example, although Lang et al. (1989) find some evidence that 
acquisition synergy increases with the acquirer’s Tobin’s Q and decreases with the target’s 
Tobin’s Q, our sample of acquisitions in the 1990s may yield quite different patterns given the 
findings of Bhagat et al. (2005) and Dong et al. (2005). Similarly, acquisitions of related assets or 
businesses could generate greater synergy because of the potential for cost saving through 
economies of scale, but recent research on “diversification discount” (see, for example, Campa 
and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004a, b)) suggests that diversification does not necessarily 
lead to lower firm value and sometimes is associated with higher firm value.  
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3.2. Main results 
3.2.1. Acquisition synergies 
We present the results from the synergy regressions in Table 3.4. In the first two 
columns, the only explanatory variables we include are the shareholder-rights difference and the 
bidder’s size. Our objective is to ensure that any identified effect of shareholder-rights difference 
on acquisition synergy is not driven by the presence of control variables that are potentially 
endogenously determined, such as Tobin’s Q, leverage, and the method of payment. Coefficient 
estimates show that consistent with our hypothesis, the shareholder-rights difference has a 
positive effect on acquisition synergy and the effect is significant both statistically and 
economically. For example, the coefficient estimate of the shareholder-rights difference is 0.320 
with a t-statistic of 3.10 in column (2). GIM assign firms with an index of 5 or below to a 
“Democracy” portfolio and firms with an index of 14 or above to a “Dictatorship” portfolio. 
Given that the difference in the GIM index between a typical “dictatorship” firm and a typical  
“democracy” firm is about 10, the percentage synergy generated by the acquisition of a 
“dictatorship” firm by a “democracy” firm will be about 3.20% higher than that generated by the 
combination of two firms with the same GIM index. We also find that the bidder’s size has a 
significantly negative effect on acquisition synergy, in line with the univariate results of Moeller 
et al. (2004).  
In the third column, we include all explanatory variables regardless of whether they are 
potentially endogenous. We find that the shareholder-rights difference continues to have a 
significantly positive effect on acquisition synergy, but neither the bidder’s Q nor the target’s Q 
appears to be related to acquisition synergy. Acquisitions made by bidders that are smaller or 
have better performance measured by ROA generate greater synergy. We also find that purely 
cash financed acquisitions and tender offers are associated with significantly higher synergy, and 
mergers of equals and combinations of high-tech companies create significantly lower synergy. 
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Table 3.4. Regression analysis of acquisition synergies 
 
The sample consists of 396 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 and 
2004. Both the bidder and the target are covered by the IRRC anti-takeover provision database prior to 
the acquisition. The dependent variable is PCAR, the 11-day cumulative abnormal return for a value-
weighted portfolio of the bidder and the target around the announcement date. Definitions of the 
independent variables are in the Appendix 3.1. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and acquirer clustering. a, b, and c stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for calendar year-fixed 
effects, whose coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Shareholder-rights difference:    
    (Target index – bidder index) 0.298 a 0.320 a 0.341 a 
 (2.80) (3.10) (3.30) 
    
Bidder characteristics:    
    Log(market cap)  -0.975 a -1.293 c 
  (-3.12) (-1.93) 
    Tobin’s Q   -0.157 
   (-0.28) 
    Leverage   -1.753 
   (-0.68) 
    Return on assets (ROA)   11.054 c 
   (1.72) 
Target characteristics:    
    Log(market cap)   0.901 
   (1.36) 
    Tobin’s Q   -0.704 
   (-1.10) 
    Leverage   2.152 
   (0.97) 
    Return on assets (ROA)   2.639 
   (0.62) 
Deal characteristics:    
    Market cap ratio   -0.001 
   (-0.00) 
    Tender offer    2.574 b 
   (2.14) 
    Diversifying acquisition    2.149 
   (1.52) 
    All cash deal   2.653 b 
   (2.09) 
    Merger of equals   -3.863 b 
   (-2.13) 
    High-tech combination   -2.975 a 
   (-3.16) 
    
Number of Obs. 396 396 396 
Adjusted R2 3.7% 6.8% 13.3% 
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We also investigate whether our results are driven by acquisitions clustering within a 
particular time period. We re-estimate model (3) in Table 3.4 on subsamples of acquisitions from 
1990 to 1994 (64 transactions), from 1995 to 1999 (210 transactions), and from 2000 to 2004 
(122 transactions), respectively. The shareholder-rights difference has a positive effect on 
acquisition synergy in each subsample regression. Its coefficient is 0.323 with a t-statistic of 1.51 
(significant at the 10% level based on a one-sided test) for the period from 1990 to 1994, 0.341 
with a t-statistic of 2.72 for the period from 1995 to 1999, and 0.553 with a t-statistic of 2.43 for 
the period from 2000 to 2004. Therefore, our results appear to hold up well through the entire 
sample period. 
We conduct additional analyses to rule out the possibility that we obtain our results 
simply because Tobin’s Q does not enter the synergy regression in the correct form. As 
alternatives to the acquirer’s and the target’s raw Qs that we include as explanatory variables in 
Table 3.4, we experiment with a number of Q-based variables such as (i) industry-median 
adjusted Qs, (ii) both industry-median Qs and industry-adjusted Qs, (iii) the difference in raw Q 
between the acquirer and the target, and (iv) the difference in industry-adjusted Q between the 
acquirer and the target. None of these variables has a significant effect on acquisition synergy, 
regardless of whether the shareholder-rights difference is included as a regressor. Replacing the 
raw Qs of the target and the acquirer with these variables hardly changes the magnitude and 
significance level of the coefficient of the shareholder-rights difference (unreported but available 
upon request). This suggests that the shareholder-rights difference clearly has incremental 
explanatory power over Tobin’s Q. 
We also replace the contemporaneous Qs in Table 3.4 with historical average Qs 
measured over the period from 1980 to 1985. Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2005) find that once they 
control for a firm’s historical average Q from 1980 to 1985, the contemporaneous relation 
between shareholder rights and firm value documented by GIM and BCF for the period from 
1990 to 2003 disappears. We restrict our analysis to the 223 acquisitions in which both the 
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acquirer and the target have at least one year of COMPUSTAT data between 1980 and 1985 so 
that we can construct a historical average Q over that period for the acquirer and the target, 
respectively. We find that the coefficient of neither historical average Q is significant, while the 
shareholder-rights difference continues to have a significant and positive effect on synergy 
(coefficient: 0.287; t-statistic: 2.08). 
Overall, the evidence reported in this section supports our hypothesis that acquisitions of 
firms with poor corporate governance by firms with good corporate governance generate more 
efficiency gains. We next examine the division of these efficiency gains between target 
shareholders and acquirer shareholders, i.e., the effects of the shareholder-rights difference on 
takeover premiums/target returns and acquirer returns. 
 
3.2.2. Target and acquirer returns 
We present results from regressions of target returns, acquisition premiums, and acquirer 
returns in Table 3.5. The explanatory variables are the same as in Table 3.4. We find that the 
shareholder-rights difference has significantly positive effects on target returns, takeover 
premiums, and bidder returns, reinforcing the evidence in the preceding section and lending 
further support to our hypothesis that acquisitions of poorly governed targets by well governed 
acquirers create more value. These results also suggest that target shareholders and acquirer 
shareholders share the valuation effects of changes in corporate governance.40 
 
 
                                                 
40 This finding leads to an interesting question, i.e., why don’t target managers voluntarily change their 
firms’ governance structure so that target shareholders capture all the valuation effects. The reason is that 
only a tiny portion of the valuation effects will accrue to target managers because of their typically low 
percentage ownership of their companies (the percentage stock and stock option ownerships are about 0.4% 
and 0.8%, respectively, for the median CEO in the 1992-2003 ExecuComp database), but target managers 
bear the full cost of improving corporate governance in the form of reduced private benefits of control, 
which could be substantial. Therefore, target managers usually do not have enough incentives to voluntarily 
change the governance structure at their firms. This incentive problem is solved in the context of mergers 
and acquisitions where acquirers make sizable side payments to target managers as documented by 
Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) so that target managers are willing to give up control of their 
companies. 
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Table 3.5. Regression analysis of target returns, takeover premiums and bidder returns 
 
The sample consists of 396 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 and 
2004. Both the bidder and the target are covered by the IRRC anti-takeover provision database prior to the 
acquisition. The dependent variable in column (1) is TCAR, the 11-day target cumulative abnormal return 
around the announcement date. The dependent variable in column (2) is PREM, the premium of offer price 
to target trading price 1 week prior to the announcement date. The dependent variable in column (3) is 
ACAR, the 11-day acquirer cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date. Definitions of the 
independent variables are in the Appendix 3.1. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and acquirer clustering. a, b, and c stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for calendar year-fixed 
effects, whose coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TCAR PREM ACAR 
Shareholder-rights difference:    
    (Target index – bidder index) 0.836 a 1.001 a 0.222 b 
 (3.48) (3.31) (2.10) 
Bidder characteristics:    
    Log(market cap) 2.084 1.608 0.773 
 (1.25) (0.73) (1.15) 
    Tobin’s Q -0.543 -0.269 -0.287 
 (-0.57) (-0.25) (-0.53) 
    Leverage -10.512 c -3.157 -1.943 
 (-1.71) (-0.33) (-0.70) 
    Return on assets (ROA)  35.827 a 11.923 9.784 
 (2.66) (0.72) (1.48) 
Target characteristics:    
    Log(market cap) -3.985 b -4.057 c -0.892 
 (-2.48) (-1.94) (-1.34) 
    Tobin’s Q -0.114 1.658 -0.713 
 (-0.10) (1.23) (-1.44) 
    Leverage -1.101 -5.345 2.487 
 (-0.17) (-0.68) (1.12) 
    Return on assets (ROA) -12.927 -7.137 2.358 
 (-1.20) (-0.49) (0.56) 
Deal characteristics:    
    Market cap ratio -5.770 -6.752 -0.159 
 (-1.59) (-1.23) (-0.07) 
    Tender offer  9.859 b 9.332 b 1.982 c 
 (2.55) (2.15) (1.71) 
    Diversifying acquisition  3.873 2.861 0.997 
 (1.50) (0.99) (1.05) 
    All cash deal  2.022  -0.370  2.612 b 
 (0.44) (-0.07) (2.15) 
    Merger of equals -9.446 a -13.915 a 1.645 
 (-3.99) (-3.94) (0.42) 
    High-tech combination  0.042  4.483  -2.916 a 
 (0.01) (1.20) (-2.89) 
    
Number of Obs. 396 391 396 
Adjusted R2 21.6% 14.6% 7.5% 
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For the control variables, most of the parameter estimates are qualitatively similar to what 
other authors find (see, e.g., Huang and Walkling (1987), Servaes (1991), Schwert (2000), Officer 
(2003), Moeller et al. (2004), Dong et al. (2005), and Masulis et al. (2006)). In particular, we 
observe that target returns or takeover premiums are significantly lower when targets are larger, 
significantly higher in tender offers, and significantly lower in mergers of equals, and that bidder 
returns are significantly higher in purely cash financed transactions and tender offers, and 
significantly lower in deals combining high-tech companies.  
 
3.3. Additional analyses 
3.3.1. Efficiency vs. censoring 
One potential concern about our findings is that they could be driven by a censoring 
problem. The reason is that targets with more ATPs (weaker shareholder rights) are more difficult 
to acquire. Therefore, it is possible that an acquisition involving a target with strong takeover 
protection will only happen when the acquisition’s synergy is high enough to be worth the trouble 
for a potential bidder to overcome the difficulty presented by target ATPs and eventually take 
over the target. This censoring-based hypothesis predicts a positive relation between acquisition 
synergy and the target’s shareholder-rights index. However, our efficiency-based hypothesis 
predicts a positive relation between acquisition synergy and the shareholder-rights difference. To 
see which prediction prevails, we re-estimate the regressions of acquisition synergy, takeover 
premium, target returns and acquirer returns in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, with the target’s shareholder-
rights index included as an additional regressor. Table 3.6 presents the estimation results. In all 
four regressions, the shareholder-rights difference continues to have a positive and significant 
coefficient, while the coefficient of the target’s shareholder-rights index never turns out 
significant. We conclude that the censoring problem does not appear to be responsible for our 
findings. 
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Table 3.6. Efficiency vs. censoring 
 
The sample consists of 396 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 and 
2004. The dependent variable in column (1) is PCAR, the 11-day cumulative abnormal return for a value-
weighted portfolio of the bidder and the target around the announcement date. The dependent variable in 
column (2) is TCAR, the 11-day target cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date. The 
dependent variable in column (3) is PREM, the premium of offer price to target trading price 1 week prior 
to the announcement date. The dependent variable in column (4) is ACAR, the 11-day acquirer cumulative 
abnormal return around the announcement date. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and acquirer clustering. a, b, and c stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year-fixed effects. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PCAR TCAR PREM ACAR 
Shareholder-rights difference:     
    (Target index – bidder index) 0.308 b 0.567 c 0.866 b 0.283 b 
 (2.14) (1.74) (2.03) (2.01) 
    Target index 0.063 0.488 0.262 -0.119 
 (0.30) (1.03) (0.40) (-0.60) 
Bidder characteristics:     
    Log(market cap) -1.281 c 2.604 1.651 0.753 
 (-1.91) (1.57) (0.75) (1.12) 
    Tobin’s Q -0.142 -0.546 -0.211 -0.315 
 (-0.25) (-0.58) (-0.20) (-0.59) 
    Leverage -1.785 -8.724 -3.288 -1.888 
 (-0.69) (-1.50) (-0.34) (-0.68) 
    Return on assets (ROA) 10.839 c  33.035 b 11.070 10.186 
 (1.69) (2.50) (0.66) (1.54) 
Target characteristics:     
    Log(market cap) 0.876 -4.159 a -4.153 c -0.848 
 (1.31) (-2.63) (-1.95) (-1.27) 
    Tobin’s Q -0.700 -0.061 1.674 -0.720 
 (-1.08) (-0.05) (1.24) (-1.46) 
    Leverage 2.112 -0.909 -5.519 2.562 
 (0.94) (-0.16) (-0.70) (1.15) 
    Return on assets (ROA) 2.669 -12.731 -7.058 2.313 
 (0.62) (-1.11) (-0.49) (0.55) 
Deal characteristics:     
    Market cap ratio 0.048 -5.072 -6.577 -0.241 
 (0.02) (-1.41) (-1.18) (-0.10) 
    Tender offer  2.564 b 10.299 a 9.276 b 2.006 c 
 (2.15) (2.69) (2.13) (1.73) 
    Diversifying acquisition  2.122 2.614 2.840 1.005 
 (1.49) (1.13) (0.98) (1.06) 
    All cash deal 2.672 b  2.616  -0.284  2.573 b 
 (2.09) (0.62) (-0.06) (2.12) 
    Merger of equals -3.877 b -8.370 a -13.967 a 1.668 
 (-2.14) (-3.44) (-3.95) (0.82) 
    High-tech combination -2.940 a  1.118  4.624  -2.982 a 
 (-3.06) (0.38) (1.24) (-2.95) 
Number of Obs. 396 396 391 396 
Adjusted R2 13.1 % 22.4% 14.4% 7.3% 
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3.3.2. Changes in operating performance 
Our evidence based on abnormal stock returns around acquisition announcements is 
consistent with the hypothesis that acquisitions of poorly governed targets by well governed 
acquirers generate more efficiency gains. However, it is interesting to see whether the stock 
market’s expectations in fact materialize and through what channels the efficiency gains are 
achieved. Toward that end, we examine the effect of the shareholder-rights difference on the 
change in operating performance of the combined company from pre-acquisition to post-
acquisition. 
Ideally, we would like to study the operating performance changes of target companies 
alone. However, the lack of post-acquisition data on target companies does not allow us to carry 
out such an analysis. The lack of data also prevents us from examining changes in perhaps more 
salient features of targets such as investment and executive compensation policies. The 
shareholder wealth effects of these more isolated yet significant corporate decisions do not 
necessarily manifest themselves through operating performance. For example, overly generous 
stock option grants awarded to executives do not reduce a company’s reported earnings until very 
recently, and the sometimes staggering amount of money that shareholders lose because their 
managers overpay for acquisitions (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005)) are not reflected in 
financial statements, either. All this will bias against us finding significant results by examining 
operating performance changes of combined companies. 
We measure operating performance as return on assets (ROA), i.e., the ratio of operating 
incomes to the book value of total assets (item 13/item 6). To identify operating performance 
changes due to mergers alone, we select control companies for acquirers and targets based on 
industry classification (2-digit SIC) and pre-merger operating performance to filter out the effects 
of industry-wide factors and the well-known mean reversion of accounting performance 
measures. Barber and Lyon (1996) show that performance matching is especially important if 
sample companies have abnormal pre-event performance. This happens to be the case for the 
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acquirers in our sample; their mean and median industry-adjusted ROAs for the year prior to an 
acquisition announcement are 0.054 and 0.024, both significant at the 1% level.  
For the acquirer in an acquisition, we select its control company in the year immediately 
prior to the acquisition announcement. We first identify all other firms with the same two-digit 
SIC code as the acquiring company, and then choose the firm whose ROA is the closest to that of 
the acquirer. The control company for the target in an acquisition is selected in the same manner. 
The acquirer’s (target’s) performance-adjusted ROA for the pre-merger year is calculated as its 
ROA minus its matching company’s ROA. For the fiscal year prior to each merger, we construct 
an imaginary combined company whose performance-adjusted ROA, Pre_adj_ROA, is the 
weighted average performance-adjusted ROA of the acquirer and the target, with the weights 
being the book values of total assets for the two merging companies. We find that the mean and 
median of Pre_adj_ROA are 0.001 and 0.000, neither significantly different from zero, attesting 
to the ability of our performance matching to eliminate pre-event abnormal performance.  
We track each acquisition for three years after its completion. For each year, we calculate 
the weighted average ROA of the acquirer’s control firm and the target’s control firm, and 
subtract it from the merged company’s ROA. We then compute the three-year average of the 
resultant performance-adjusted ROAs, and denote it as Post_adj_ROA. We define the operating 
performance change of the combined company as the difference between Pre_adj_ROA and 
Post_adj_ROA, denoted as ∆Adj_ROA. The mean (median) of ∆Adj_ROA is 0.014 (0.003), which 
is significant at the 1% (5%) level. This is consistent with the earlier stock return evidence that 
the combined abnormal return of the acquirer and the target (PCAR) is on average positive (see 
Table 3.2).  
 We regress the operating performance changes of combined companies against the 
shareholder-rights difference and other explanatory variables included in the synergy regressions. 
Results in column (1) of Table 3.7 indicate that the shareholder-rights difference has a significant 
and positive coefficient, implying that acquisitions of poorly governed targets by well governed 
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acquirers experience greater operating performance improvements. We also repeat the above 
performance matching procedure and regression analysis using return on sales (ROS, which is 
equal to item 13/item 12) as an alternative performance measure, and again find a significantly 
positive coefficient for the shareholder-rights difference (see column (2) of Table 3.7). These 
findings echo the abnormal return-based evidence we present earlier, and suggest that the stock 
market anticipates future operating performance changes and reacts to acquisition announcements 
accordingly.41 
These results can also help differentiate our hypothesis from potential alternative 
explanations of our abnormal return-based evidence. For example, it can be argued that 
acquisitions involving targets with more ATPs (weaker shareholder rights) may be less 
anticipated by the stock market than acquisitions involving targets with fewer ATPs. As a result, 
we could observe higher announcement-period abnormal returns for the former group of deals 
than for the latter, given that on average mergers generate positive abnormal stock returns. This 
market surprise-based argument may have some power in explaining our stock return evidence, 
but it has no prediction regarding the relation between the shareholder-rights difference and the 
operating performance change of a combined company from pre-acquisition to post-acquisition. 
On the contrary, our efficiency-based hypothesis is able to explain not only the positive relation 
between the shareholder-rights difference and the total returns of an acquisition, but also the 
positive relation between the shareholder-rights difference and the operating performance change 
of the combined company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 The sample size is reduced by 99 observations for the regressions in Table 6, since we require that for 
each acquisition, the merged company and control companies of the acquirer and the target have 
accounting data for the first three years after the completion of the acquisition. Our results from synergy 
regressions continue to hold in this smaller subsample. 
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Table 3.7. Regression analysis of changes in performance-adjusted ROA and ROS 
 
The sample consists of 297 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 and 
2004. The dependent variable in column (1) is the difference between Post_adj_ROA and Pre_adj_ROA. 
Post_adj_ROA is the three-year average of the performance-adjusted return on assets (ROA) of the merged 
company after the acquisition. Pre_adj_ROA is the weighted average performance-adjusted ROA of the 
acquirer and the target in the year immediately prior to the acquisition, with the weights being the book 
values of total assets for the two merging companies. The dependent variable in column (2) is defined in 
similar manner, except that the operating performance measure is return on sales (ROS). Definitions of the 
independent variables are in Appendix 3.1. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and acquirer clustering. a, b, and c stand for statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for calendar year-fixed effects. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Change in performance-adjusted ROA 
Change in performance-adjusted 
ROS 
Shareholder-rights difference:   
    (Target index – bidder index) 0.003 a 0.004 b 
 (2.73) (2.01) 
Bidder characteristics:   
    Log(market cap) 0.010 0.012 
 (1.37) (0.85) 
    Tobin’s Q 0.012 c 0.014 c 
 (1.75) (1.79) 
    Leverage -0.051 0.101 
 (-1.25) (1.41) 
    Return on assets (ROA)  -0.132  0.002 
 (-1.55) (0.02) 
Target characteristics:   
    Log(market cap) -0.019 b -0.005 
 (-2.33) (-0.40) 
    Tobin’s Q 0.007 -0.012 
 (0.86) (-1.36) 
    Leverage -0.042 -0.043 
 (-1.04) (-0.73) 
    Return on assets (ROA) 0.038 -0.182 
 (0.57) (-1.36) 
Deal characteristics:   
    Market cap ratio 0.030 0.073 
 (1.33) (1.20) 
    Tender offer  0.031 b 0.046 c 
 (2.42) (1.84) 
    Diversifying acquisition  0.006 0.030 c 
 (0.54) (1.66) 
    All cash deal  -0.002  -0.029 
 (-0.12) (-1.36) 
    Merger of equals 0.041 -0.003 
 (1.22) (-0.05) 
    High-tech combination  -0.007  0.010 
 (-0.47) (0.42) 
Number of Obs. 297 297 
Adjusted R2 11.02% 9.54% 
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3.3.3. Managerial ability as an omitted variable 
Although our focus on exogenous governance changes at targets facilitates causality 
inferences, we need to address another endogeneity-related problem before we are able to 
conclude that corporate governance changes contribute to the value creation of acquisitions. The 
concern is that some unobservable factors could be responsible for both the difference in 
shareholder rights and the total returns of an acquisition. One factor that may have this property is 
the difference in managerial ability between the acquirer and the target. It is conceivable that 
incompetent managers run their firms inefficiently and adopt weaker shareholder rights to 
entrench themselves and that acquisitions of firms with incompetent managers by firms with 
competent managers generate more value. In other words, the difference in shareholder rights 
may simply proxy for the difference in managerial ability. 
We conduct four tests to address the above concern. In the first test, we construct a proxy 
for managerial ability similar to the one used by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990). 
Specifically, we measure managerial ability by the industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) 
averaged over the three years prior to acquisition announcement. We then take the difference in 
the managerial ability proxy between the acquirer and the target and include it as an additional 
control variable in the synergy regression. 
Results reported in column (1) of Table 3.8 show that the difference in managerial ability 
has a positive coefficient with a t-statistic of 1.36, which is significant at the 10% level based on a 
one-sided test. Therefore, there is some evidence that acquisitions of firms with incompetent 
managers by firms with competent managers generate more value. But more important to our 
purpose, we find that the shareholder-rights difference continues to have a significantly positive 
effect on acquisition synergy. Therefore, our earlier findings do not appear to be driven by 
managerial ability. 
In the second test, we limit our attention to a sample of 70 acquisitions for which both the 
target and the acquirer went public prior to 1990 and both the target’s CEO and the acquirer’s 
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CEO at the acquisition announcement took office after 1990. 42  For these acquisitions, the 
difference in managerial ability between the acquirer and the target at the time of the acquisition 
announcement is unlikely to drive the difference in shareholder rights. The reason is that for firms 
that went public prior to 1990, most of their shareholder-rights provisions were adopted in the 
1980s (see Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)), and therefore, CEOs who took office after 1990 
can not be responsible for adopting these provisions. We re-run the synergy regression on this 
subsample, and report the results in column (2) of Table 3.8. Despite the small sample size, the 
effect of the shareholder-rights difference on synergy is still significantly positive. 
Although our sample selection criteria for this subsample ensure that the difference in 
managerial ability between acquirer and target CEOs at acquisition announcement can not cause 
the difference in shareholder rights, these two variables could still be correlated. The reason is 
that managers of certain quality could bequest their positions to managers with similar quality. 
Therefore, the abilities of acquirer and target CEOs at acquisition announcement could be 
positively correlated with the abilities of their respective predecessors who were in office during 
1980s and who potentially shaped the shareholder-rights landscape at their companies. In other 
words, the managerial ability difference at acquisition announcement and the shareholder-rights 
difference are correlated because both are influenced by the managerial ability difference in the 
1980s. The implication of this possibility is that the regression in column (2) of Table 3.8 still 
suffers from an omitted variable problem with the omitted variable being the difference in ability 
between acquirer CEO and target CEO who were in office during the 1980s. To address this 
issue, we measure the acquirer (target) CEO ability during the 1980s by the acquirer’s (target’s) 
average industry-adjusted ROA from 1985 to 1989, and then include the managerial-ability 
difference in the 1980s as another regressor. The results in column (3) of Table 3.8 indicate that 
                                                 
42 We match the acquirers and targets in our sample to the ExecuComp database to obtain the information 
on when a CEO took office. 
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this additional control does not change our finding; the coefficient of the shareholder-rights 
difference is significantly positive and not much different from that in column (2). 
In our third test, we focus on the six state-level ATPs in the GIM index, and create a 
difference in state-level ATPs and a difference in firm-level ATPs between the acquirer and the 
target for each acquisition. We then create a subsample of 178 acquisitions where both acquirers 
and targets were initially incorporated before 1985 and if they were ever reincorporated, the 
reincorporation happened before 1985.43 This restriction, coupled with the fact that nearly all of 
the second-generation state-level ATPs were adopted between 1985 and 1991 (Bebchuk and 
Cohen (2003)), ensures that for these acquirers and targets, neither their managers in the 1980s 
nor their managers at acquisition announcements determine the state-level ATPs that they are 
subject to. Therefore, the state-level ATP difference is not susceptible to the problem of 
managerial-ability difference as an omitted variable. We re-estimate the synergy regression with 
the overall shareholder-rights difference replaced by the state-level ATP difference and the firm-
level ATP difference. Results reported in column (4) of Table 3.8 show that the state-level ATP 
difference has a positive and significant coefficient, evidence that the omitted variable problem is 
at least not entirely responsible for our findings. 
In our fourth test, we circumvent the problem of managerial-ability difference being an 
omitted variable by focusing on acquisitions in which target CEOs were not removed and instead 
stayed at the combined companies. For each of the 396 acquisitions in our sample, we read the 
proxy statement of the combined firm immediately after the deal completion date and search 
news reports using Lexis-Nexis around the deal announcement and completion dates to identify 
what happened to the target CEO. We find that the target CEO stayed at the combined company 
in 244 deals. We eliminate 54 deals in which target CEOs stayed for less than one year, since 
these CEOs may simply be around to help the transition or integration. We also exclude 47 deals 
in which target CEOs held non-operational positions such as director and vice chairman. Our 
                                                 
43 We use Moody’s Manual to find each firm’s incorporation date and reincorporation history.  
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final sample consists of 143 transactions in which target CEO became CEO, Chairman of the 
Board, President, Vice President, or Chief Operating Officer of the combined company, or 
became head of a subsidiary that target assets and operations are now part of. We re-estimate the 
synergy regression in this subsample and present the results in column (5) of Table 3.8. The 
shareholder-rights difference continues to have a positive and significant effect on acquisition 
synergy, again suggesting that the managerial ability difference is not driving our findings.  
 
Table 3.8. Controlling for the difference in managerial ability 
 
The subsample used for the first regression consists of 373 acquisitions for which both the target and the 
acquirer have COMPUSTAT data available for the three years prior to the acquisition announcement. The 
subsample used for the second and third regression consists of 70 acquisitions for which both the target and 
the acquirer went public prior to 1990 and both the target’s CEO and the acquirer’s CEO at the acquisition 
announcement took office after 1990. The subsample used for the fourth regression consists of 178 
acquisitions for which both the acquirer and the target were initially incorporated before 1985 and if they 
were ever reincorporated, the reincorporation happened before 1985. The subsample used for the fifth 
regression consists of 143 acquisitions for which target CEO became CEO, Chairman of the Board, 
President, Vice President, Chief Operating Office of the combined company, or became head of a 
subsidiary that target assets and operations are now part of. All four subsamples are drawn from 396 
completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 and 2004. Both the acquirer and the 
target are covered by the IRRC anti-takeover provision database prior to the acquisition. The dependent 
variable for all the regressions is PCAR, the 11-day cumulative abnormal return for a value-weighted 
portfolio of the bidder and the target around the announcement date. Bidder (target) average ROA-3, -1 is the 
bidder’s (target’s) average industry-adjusted ROA over the three years prior to acquisition announcement. 
Bidder (target) average ROA1985, 1989 is the bidder’s (target’s) average industry-adjusted ROA from 1985 to 
1989. State-level ATP difference is equal to the number of target state-level ATPs minus the number of 
bidder state-level ATPs. Firm-level ATP difference is equal to the number of target firm-level ATPs minus 
the number of bidder firm-level ATPs. Definitions of other independent variables are in Appendix 3.1. In 
parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and 
acquirer clustering. a, b, and c stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
All regressions control for calendar year-fixed effects, whose coefficient estimates are suppressed for 
brevity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 PCAR PCAR PCAR PCAR PCAR 
Shareholder-rights difference:      
    (Target index – bidder index) 0.301 a 0.626 b 0.622 b  0.496 a 
 (2.79) (2.03) (2.02)  (2.94) 
      
Managerial-ability difference:      
4.366         Bidder average ROA-3, -1  
    – target average ROA-3, -1 (1.36)     
      
Managerial-ability difference:      
  7.600       Bidder average ROA1985, 1989  
    – target average ROA1985, 1989   (0.59)   
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State-level ATP difference    0.567 c  
    (1.79)  
      
Firm-level ATP difference    0.547 a  
    (2.90)  
      
Bidder characteristics:      
    Log(market cap) -1.273 c -0.106 -0.257 -0.813 0.784 
 (-1.78) (-0.06) (-0.12) (-0.70) (0.58) 
    Tobin’s Q 0.042 -1.627 c -1.481 c -0.019 -2.427 a 
 (0.09) (-1.82) (-1.74) (-0.03) (-3.65) 
    Leverage -1.957 0.822 0.681 -4.801 -18.028 a 
 (-0.78) (0.11) (0.09) (-0.96) (-3.10) 
    Return on assets (ROA)  28.782 c 19.167 2.106 25.688 c 
  (1.70) (1.39) (0.22) (1.88) 
Target characteristics:      
    Log(market cap) 0.831 -0.948 -0.766 0.061 -1.409 
 (1.19) (-0.47) (-0.34) (0.06) (-0.95) 
    Tobin’s Q -0.650 0.864 0.757 -0.595 -0.429 
 (-0.96) (1.13) (0.97) (-0.55) (-0.56) 
    Leverage 3.449 4.599 4.712 2.284 5.325 
 (1.53) (0.75) (0.72) (0.66) (1.27) 
    Return on assets (ROA)  2.182 5.914 5.443 8.789 
  (0.33) (0.62) (0.64) (0.92) 
Deal characteristics:      
    Market cap ratio 1.237 1.237 0.836 5.914 12.918 b 
 (0.45) (0.16) (0.10) (1.57) (2.30) 
    Tender offer  2.385 b -2.255 -1.649 -1.401 5.300 b 
 (2.18) (-0.78) (-0.57) (-0.89) (2.08) 
    Diversifying acquisition  2.426 b 4.087 c 4.199 c 6.071 b 1.363 
 (2.29) (1.68) (1.71) (2.36) (0.83) 
    All cash deal 3.386 a  6.204 c  6.657 c  3.294 c  4.255 c 
 (2.74) (1.92) (1.97) (1.78) (1.95) 
    Merger of equals -4.563 b 1.861 1.805 -2.512 -5.535 b 
 (-2.36) (0.35) (0.32) (-0.94) (-2.07) 
    High-tech combination -2.157 b  -7.410 b  -7.326 b  -1.360 -0.107 
 (-2.12) (-2.24) (-2.14) (-0.83) (-0.07) 
      
Intercept 4.312 3.799 3.706 5.889 4.147 
 (1.18) (0.43) (0.39) (1.36) (0.82) 
      
Number of Obs. 373 70 70 178 143 
Adjusted R2 12.9% 34.6% 33.6% 10.6% 26.8% 
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3.3.4. Bidder shareholder-rights changes 
We mentioned in the introduction that acquirers’ shareholder rights provisions do not 
change during acquisitions, and will apply to the combined companies as a result of the 
transactions. However, this does not mean that a bidder’s shareholder rights will stay the same 
from the pre-acquisition IRRC publication year to the post-acquisition publication year, a period 
that is at least two years long. Of the 396 acquisitions in our sample, 335 are such that the bidder 
has IRRC coverage in the two consecutive publication years encompassing the acquisition. We 
find that there are 155 acquisitions where bidders experience changes in the shareholder-rights 
index from the pre-acquisition publication year to the post-acquisition one. We randomly select 
50 of these deals and read the news reports on the acquiring company in the Wall Street Journal 
around the announcement and completion dates of each acquisition. We do not find any mention 
of shareholder-rights changes for any of the deals, indicating that the changes do not appear to be 
driven by acquisitions.  
We then limit our sample to the 180 acquisitions where bidders experience no change in 
the shareholder-rights index between the two consecutive publication years encompassing 
acquisitions. We re-estimate all our regressions using this subsample and present the results in 
Table 3.9. We find that the shareholder-rights difference between acquirers and targets continues 
to have positive effects on acquisition synergy, target return, acquisition premium, and acquirer 
return, with all but the last relation statistically significant at the 5% or 1% level despite the 
substantially smaller sample size.  
 
3.3.5. A dummy-variable approach 
 We also estimate an alternatively specified synergy model in which we replace the 
shareholder-rights difference with two dummy variables. The first dummy is equal to 1 for 
acquisitions where the bidder has stronger-than-sample-median shareholder rights and the target 
has weaker-than-sample-median shareholder rights, or 0 otherwise. The second dummy is equal  
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Table 3.9. Subsample regression analysis 
 
The sample used for the regressions in this table consists of 180 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions 
(listed in SDC) between 1990 and 2004. The bidder experiences no change in the shareholder-rights index 
between the two consecutive IRRC publication years encompassing the acquisition. The dependent variable 
in column (1) is PCAR, the 11-day cumulative abnormal return for a value-weighted portfolio of the bidder 
and the target around the announcement date. The dependent variable in column (2) is TCAR, the 11-day 
target cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date. The dependent variable in column (3) is 
PREM, the premium of offer price to target trading price 1 week prior to the announcement date. The 
dependent variable in column (4) is ACAR, the 11-day acquirer cumulative abnormal return around the 
announcement date. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(White (1980)) and acquirer clustering. a, b, and c stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. All regressions control for calendar year-fixed effects. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PCAR TCAR PREM ACAR 
Shareholder-rights difference:     
    (Target index – bidder index) 0.261 b 1.029 a 0.964 b 0.105 
 (1.99) (3.08) (1.98) (0.68) 
Bidder characteristics:     
    Log(market cap) -1.298 -1.901 -2.217 1.040 
 (-1.57) (-0.97) (-0.69) (1.11) 
    Tobin’s Q 0.156 0.952 2.327 -0.252 
 (0.25) (0.55) (1.11) (-0.37) 
    Leverage 1.616 -9.704 -0.218 -1.641 
 (0.41) (-0.91) (-0.01) (-0.33) 
    Return on assets (ROA) 3.766  55.867 b 24.471 3.599 
 (0.40) (2.56) (0.72) (0.31) 
Target characteristics:     
    Log(market cap) 1.096 -0.516 -1.048 -1.088 
 (1.36) (-0.31) (-0.37) (-1.23) 
    Tobin’s Q -0.441 0.434 1.569 -0.460 
 (-0.57) (0.22) (0.59) (-0.55) 
    Leverage 2.645 -2.050 -3.739 4.152 
 (0.77) (-0.21) (-0.30) (1.03) 
    Return on assets (ROA) 1.925 -26.318 c -29.341 1.109 
 (0.28) (-1.78) (-1.33) (0.15) 
Deal characteristics:     
    Market cap ratio -0.036 -14.032 a -14.085 c 1.066 
 (-0.02) (-3.04) (-1.80) (0.37) 
    Tender offer  2.514 12.344 a 7.674 1.194 
 (1.61) (2.86) (1.42) (0.75) 
    Diversifying acquisition  2.673 c 1.645 2.126 2.178 
 (1.70) (0.42) (0.48) (1.36) 
    All cash deal 2.860  4.757  5.185  2.919 
 (1.58) (0.74) (0.69) (1.56) 
    Merger of equals -7.685 b -8.896 b -15.338 b -3.665 
 (-2.58) (-2.07) (-2.10) (-1.14) 
    High-tech combination -3.653 b  0.253  8.296  -3.929 b 
 (-2.39) (0.05) (1.21) (-2.43) 
Number of Obs. 180 180 179 180 
Adjusted R2 13.0% 24.8% 14.5% 3.5% 
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to one for acquisitions where the bidder has weaker-than-sample-median shareholder rights and 
the target has stronger-than-sample-median shareholder rights, or zero otherwise. Regression 
results (unreported, but available upon request) show that the coefficient estimate of the first 
dummy is positive with a robust t-statistic of 2.15, and the coefficient of the second dummy is 
negative with a robust t-statistic of 1.40, significant at the 10% level based on a one-sided test. 
This is consistent with our earlier evidence that acquisitions of firms with poor (good) governance 
by firms with good (poor) governance generate more (less) synergy.  
 
3.3.6. Corporate governance improvement vs. deterioration 
 We also explore whether the effect of the shareholder-rights difference on acquisition 
synergy depends on whether an acquisition results in an improvement in or deterioration of target 
corporate governance. We create a dummy variable that is equal to one for acquisitions in which 
the target has stronger shareholder rights than the acquirer, or zero otherwise. We include an 
interaction term between this dummy variable and the shareholder-rights difference as an 
additional independent variable in synergy regressions. We find that the shareholder-rights 
difference itself continues to have a significantly positive effect on synergy, and the coefficient 
estimate of the interaction term is not statistically significant at any conventional level 
(unreported, but available upon request). Therefore, the effect of the shareholder-rights difference 
appears symmetric.  
 
3.3.7. Sensitivity tests 
Our results are also robust to the following alternative specifications of our empirical 
tests: (i) we use the BCF index or the BC index to measure a firm’s shareholder rights; (ii) we 
measure abnormal announcement returns over alternative event windows such as (-1, +1) and (-2, 
+2); (iii) we measure the acquisition synergy in dollar terms instead of percentage terms; (iv) we 
raise the minimum relative deal size to 5%; (v) we experiment with several change-in-control 
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ownership thresholds other than 50%, such as 40%, 30%, and 20%;44 (vi) similar to Lang et al. 
(1989), we construct four indicator variables based on whether the acquirer’s and the target’s Q 
ratios are above or below their respective industry medians and substitute any three of them for 
the acquirer’s and the target’s Q ratios. (vii) we control for bidder’s pre-acquisition ownership in 
the target, the percentage of target shares acquired in the transaction, whether a deal is hostile and 
whether a deal is competed; (viii) in place of the all-cash indicator variable, we control for the 
percentage of deal value paid by stock, which is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1; and 
(ix) we control for both the acquirer’s and the target’s asset intangibility (item 33/item 6) as a 
proxy for asset scarcity. 
We obtain virtually the same results when we (x) exclude acquisitions made in the 
“bubble” period, i.e., years 1999 and 2000; (xi) exclude large-loss acquisitions or large-gain 
acquisitions or both, where we follow Moeller et al. (2005) in defining large-loss (or gain) 
acquisitions as those that generate more than $1 billion loss (or gain) for bidder shareholders over 
the event window; (xii) exclude hostile deals, tender offers, or competed deals, since these deals 
may have higher uncertainty of completion when first announced and thus, the abnormal returns 
around announcement may not be able to fully capture the wealth effects of these transactions 
(Bhagat et al. (2005)); (xiii) exclude mergers of equals; (xiv) exclude 37 acquisitions in which the 
target’s shareholder-rights index is the same as the acquirer’s; or (xv) exclude 15 unsolicited 
deals. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 In most U.S. mergers and acquisitions, the acquirers have very low ownership in the targets prior to 
acquisition announcements and have full control or close to full control of target shares after the 
transactions. Therefore, our sample composition does not change much when we alter the ownership 
threshold.  
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4.    Conclusion 
 
We provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that acquisitions of poorly managed 
targets by well-run acquirers create more value than other acquisitions. We focus on an important 
aspect of a firm’s corporate governance, i.e., the shareholder rights, as a proxy for how well a 
firm is run, and find that the total return of an acquisition increases with the difference in 
shareholder rights between the acquirer and the target. In other words, the stronger the acquirer’s 
shareholder rights relative to the target’s, the higher the acquisition synergy. Further analyses 
show that the shareholder rights difference has significantly positive effects on both target 
shareholder gains and bidder shareholder gains, indicating that targets and acquirers share the 
valuation effects of corporate governance transfers.  
We also examine operating performance changes of the acquirer and the target as a 
combined company from prior to an acquisition to after an acquisition. We find that the 
shareholder-rights difference has a significant and positive effect on the operating performance 
changes of the combined company. This echoes our abnormal stock return-based evidence and 
suggests that the stock market anticipates future efficiency gains and reacts to acquisition 
announcements accordingly. 
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Appendix 3.1. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Total returns, target returns/premiums, and acquirer returns 
PCAR (-5,+5) 
11-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage, calculated using the 
market model) for a value-weighted portfolio of the bidder and the target. 
The market model parameters are estimated using the portfolio return data 
for the period (-210,-11). The weights for the bidder and the target are 
based on their market capitalizations at the 6th trading day prior to the 
announcement. The target weight is adjusted for the bidder’s toehold. 
TCAR (-5,+5) 
11-day target cumulative abnormal return (in percentage) calculated using 
the market model. The market model parameters are estimated using the 
return data for the period (-210,-11). 
PREM Premium of offer price to target trading price 1 week prior to the original announcement date. This variable is taken from SDC. 
ACAR (-5,+5) 
11-day acquirer cumulative abnormal return (in percentage) calculated 
using the market model. The market model parameters are estimated using 
the return data for the period (-210,-11). 
Panel B: Shareholder-rights variables 
GIM index 
Taken from GIM (2003), based on 24 anti-takeover provisions. Higher 
index levels correspond to more managerial power and weaker shareholder 
rights.  
GIM difference Target GIM index – Bidder GIM index 
Panel C: Bidder and target characteristics 
Market capitalization Number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the 6
th 
trading day prior to announcement date. 
Tobin’s Q Market value of asset over book value of asset: (Compustat item6-item60+item25*item199)/item6. 
Leverage  Book value of debts over book value of total assets: (item34+item9)/ item6. 
ROA Operating income before depreciation (item13), scaled by book value of total assets (item6). 
Panel D: Deal characteristics 
All-cash deal Dummy variable: 1 for purely cash-financed deals, 0 otherwise. 
Diversifying Dummy variable: 1 if bidder and target do not share a 2-digit SIC industry, 0 otherwise. 
Competed Dummy variable: 1 if the deal is competed, 0 otherwise. 
Hostile Dummy variable: 1 if the bid is hostile, 0 otherwise. 
Tender offer Dummy variable: 1 for tender offers, 0 otherwise. 
Merger of equals Dummy variable: 1 if the deal is classified as merger of equals by SDC, 0 otherwise. 
High-tech combination Dummy variable: 1 if bidder and target are both from the high-tech industries defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004), 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106
References 
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., Stafford, E., 2001. New evidence and perspectives on mergers. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 103-120.  
 
Barber, B., Lyon, J., 1996. Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and 
specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics 41, 359-399. 
 
Bebchuk, L.A., Cohen, A., 2003. Firms’ decisions where to incorporate. Journal of Law and 
Economics 46, 383-425. 
 
Bebchuk, L.A., Cohen, A., 2004. The costs of entrenched boards. Journal of Financial 
Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Bebchuk, L.A., Cohen, A., Ferrell, A., 2004. What matters in corporate governance? Working 
paper, Harvard Law School. 
 
Bertrand, M., Mullainathan, S., 2001. Corporate governance and executive pay: evidence from 
takeover legislation. Working Paper, University of Chicago and MIT.  
 
Bertrand, M., Mullainathan, S., 2003. Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and 
managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy 111, 1043-1075. 
 
Bhagat, S., Dong, M., Hirshleifer, D., Noah, R., 2005. Do tender offers create value? New 
methods and evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 76, 3-60.  
 
Borokhovich, K.A., Brunarsky, K.R., Parrino, R., 1997. CEO contracting and antitakeover 
amendments. Journal of Finance 52, 1495-1517. 
 
Bradley, M., Desai, A., Kim, E.H., 1988. Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their 
division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms. Journal of Financial 
Economics 21, 3-40. 
 
Bris, A., Cabolis, C., 2005. The value of investor protection: firm-evidence from cross-border 
mergers. Working paper, Yale University.  
 
Campa, J.M., Kedia, S., 2002. Explaining the diversification discount. Journal of Finance 57, 
1731-1762. 
 
Chari, A., Ouimet, P., Tesar, L., 2005. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions in emerging 
markets: the stock market valuation of corporate control. Working paper, University of 
Michigan. 
 
Core, J., Guay, W., Rusticus, T., 2005. Does weak governance cause weak stock returns? An 
examination of firm operating performance and investors' expectations. Journal of 
Finance, forthcoming.  
 
Dong, M., Hirshleifer, D., Richardson, S., Teoh, S.H., 2005. Does investor misevaluation drive 
the takeover market? Journal of Finance, forthcoming.  
 
 107
Fahlenbrach, R., 2004. Shareholder rights and CEO compensation. Working paper, Ohio State 
University.  
 
Fuller, K., Netter, J., Stegemoller, M., 2002. What do returns to acquiring firms tell us? Evidence 
from firms that make many acquisitions. Journal of Finance 57, 1763-1794. 
 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, A., 2003. Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 118, 107-155. 
 
Hartzell, J.C., Ofek, E., Yermack, D., 2004. What’s in it for me? Personal benefits obtained by 
CEOs whose firms are acquired. Review of Financial Studies 17, 37-61. 
 
Huang, Y., Walkling, R.A., 1987. Target abnormal returns associated with acquisition 
announcements: Payment, acquisition form, and managerial resistance. Journal of 
Financial Economics 19, 329-349. 
 
Kuipers, D.R., Miller, D., Patel, A., 2003. The legal environment and corporate valuation: 
evidence from cross-border takeovers. Working paper, Texas Tech University. 
 
Lang, L.H.P., Stulz, R.M., Walkling, R.A., 1989. Managerial performance, Tobin’s Q, and the 
gains from successful tender offers. Journal of Financial Economics 24, 137-154. 
 
Lehn, K., Patro, S., Zhao, M., 2005. Governance indices and valuation multiples: which cause 
which? Working paper, University of Pittsburgh. 
 
Loughran, T., Ritter, J., 2004. Why has IPO underpricing changed over time? Financial 
Management 33, 5-37.  
 
Masulis, R., Wang, C., Xie, F., 2006. Corporate governance and acquirer returns. Journal of 
Finance, forthcoming. 
 
Moeller, S.B., Schlingemann, F.P., Stulz, R.M., 2004. Firm size and the gains from acquisitions. 
Journal of Financial Economics 73, 201-228. 
 
Moeller, S.B., Schlingemann, F.P., Stulz, R.M., 2005. Wealth destruction on a massive scale? A 
study of acquiring-firm returns in the recent merger wave. Journal of Finance 60, 757-
782. 
 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1990. Do managerial incentives drive bad acquisitions? 
Journal of Finance 45, 31-48. 
 
Officer, M., 2003. Termination fees in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 
69, 431–467. 
 
Servaes, H., 1991. Tobin’s q, agency costs, and corporate control: an empirical analysis of firm 
specific parameters. Journal of Finance 46, 409-419. 
 
Schwert, G.W., 2000. Hostility in takeovers: in the eyes of the beholder? Journal of Finance 55, 
2599-2640. 
 
 108
Starks, L., Wei, K., 2004. Cross-border mergers and differences in corporate governance. 
Working paper, University of Texas. 
 
Travlos, N., 1987. Corporate takeover bids, methods of payment, and bidding firms’ stock 
returns. Journal of Finance 42, 943-963. 
 
Villalonga, B., 2004a. Diversification discount or premium? New evidence from the business 
information tracking series. Journal of Finance 59, 479-506.  
 
Villalonga, B., 2004b. Does diversification cause the "diversification discount"? Financial 
Management 33, 5-27.  
 
White, H., 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for 
heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48, 817-838.  
 
  
 
 
